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Kim:

Toward Transatlantic Convergence in
Financial Regulation
Hwa-Jin Kim*

This Article reviews the historical background of the Glass-Steagall Act
of 1933 along with the developments in the markets that led to the Gramm-LeachBliley Act of 1999. It analyzes the discussions on the Volcker Rule in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 from a
comparative perspective. It shows how the reform in the United States may impact
financial institutions and markets in other jurisdictions. Germany and Switzerland,
where universal banking is the hallmark of the financial services industry, are the
primary jurisdictions of interest. After taking a historical and political look at the
regulation of financial institutions in the United States and Europe, this Article
touches on the issues of global regulatory reform to see if the global solution
might fit into the structural issues of financial institutions and systems. Building
on the discussions on convergence in bank corporate governance, it predicts
transatlantic convergence in the financial system and structure of banking
business preceded by convergence in the practices and strategies of financial
institutions in the United States and Europe.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The controversial Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act 1 was signed into law on July 21, 2010. It will implement the
sweeping financial reform that has been needed since the outbreak of the global
financial crisis in 2007. One of the hottest issues discussed in the legislative
* Associate Professor of Law, Seoul National University School of Law; Dr. Jur. (Munich);
LL.M. (Harvard). The author has taught at Stanford, Michigan, Tel Aviv, and IDC Herzliya Law
Schools. He thanks Johannes Bürgi and Thomas Müller of Walder Wyss, Zurich, for helpful
materials on recent developments in Switzerland, and Kimberly Timko, Alexandra Papp and Helen
No for excellent research assistance.
1

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. For summaries, see DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL
LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
(2010); SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, THE DODD-FRANK ACT:
COMMENTARY AND INSIGHTS (2010); and DEUTSCHE BANK, THE IMPLICATIONS OF LANDMARK U.S.
REG. REFORM: THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM & CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (July
2010); Viral V. Acharya et al., A Bird’s-Eye View: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, in: REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW
ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 1 (VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL. EDS., 2011).
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process of the Dodd-Frank Act was the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act of
1933, which separated investment banking from commercial banking. The
reinstatement, however, did not happen; instead, the Dodd-Frank Act adopted the
famous “Volcker-Rule,” 2 which addresses the issue, but does not introduce
comprehensive new regulations on commercial banks’ activities in capital markets.
Under the soft constraints newly imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act, the framework
established by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 remains basically intact. 3
The developments in the United States certainly impacts financial
institutions and markets in other jurisdictions. The U.S. government may urge or
encourage foreign governments to adopt the same rules if the short-term
international competitiveness of the U.S. financial institutions may be harmed
through the new regulation. There are provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act that can
be seen as an attempt to force harmonization of international financial regulation.
On the other hand, European countries also may take advantage of the regulatory
reform in the United States as new momentum in their own reform efforts. NonU.S. financial institutions may also voluntarily adapt to the new system when they
go global, particularly through acquisitions. 4
We now have various reports on the policy decisions of different
countries. For instance, Nigeria recently decided to abolish the universal banking
system as they felt that commercial banks’ risk-taking activities might jeopardize
the whole system. 5 Switzerland, on the contrary, saw no reason to change the
2

“I'm proposing a simple and common-sense reform, which we're calling the “Volcker
Rule” -- after this tall guy behind me. Banks will no longer be allowed to own, invest, or sponsor
hedge funds, private equity funds, or proprietary trading operations for their own profit, unrelated
to serving their customers. If financial firms want to trade for profit, that's something they're free
to do. Indeed, doing so – responsibly – is a good thing for the markets and the economy. But these
firms should not be allowed to run these hedge funds and private equities funds while running a
bank backed by the American people.” Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the
President on Financial Reform (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-financial-reform.
3

Yalman Onaran, Volcker Said to Be Unhappy With New Version of Rule, BLOOMBERG
BUS. WK. (June 30, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-30/volcker-said-to-beunhappy-with-new-version-of-rule.html.
4

In the period between 1995 and 2008, 1,833 bank M&As were reported. Four hundred
and sixty-six of them were cross-border deals. See George Andrew Karolyi & Alvaro G. Taboada,
The Influence of Government in Cross-Border Bank Mergers 36 (Feb. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1573168 (also reporting that
cross-border deals were larger in terms of the amount of deals).
5

Central Bank Ends Nigeria’s Universal Banking System, THE WILL, (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://thewillnigeria.com/business/3926-Central-Bank-Ends-Nigerias-Universal-BankingSystem.html.
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traditional framework. They believed that the investment banking arms of the
Swiss banks might neutralize the losses incurred by the housing loans. 6 Other
countries will have their own reasons and political background to apply to their
reform in the regulation of financial institutions and markets. The response made
by foreign governments will in turn influence U.S.-banks’ strategies in the global
financial markets. Also, if states decide to keep the universal banking system in its
traditional or modified form for strategic reasons, they will have to find
alternative tools to make sure that their large financial institutions do not create
excessive local, as well as global, systemic risk in the future.
This Article explores these questions while revisiting the universal
banking system. As universal banking is the hallmark of the European financial
services industry, 7 this paper puts the U.S. system in comparative perspective
with the European system. It takes a historical and political look at the regulation
of financial institutions in the United States and Europe. Historical and political
differences in these states can provide us with answers to how these countries
approach the restructuring of their own, as well as the global, financial services
industry. This Article also shows that the financial services industry in the United
States and Europe share one thing in common which goes beyond their pathdependent limits: it is the pursuit of economies of scale and scope to effectively
compete in global financial markets. As practices and strategies of financial
institutions on both sides of the Atlantic converge toward each other, financial
regulatory systems of the United States and Europe will do the same.
Part II lays the groundwork for analysis and comparison with a discussion
of the economics of universal banking and the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall
Act in the United States. Part III analyzes recent discussions for financial
regulatory reform from a comparative perspective. It shows how the reform in the
United States works on European infrastructures and highlights the practical
differences. Germany and Switzerland will be the primary jurisdictions of interest.
Part IV explores banks’ corporate governance issues that search for solutions to
6

Johnathan Lynn, Swiss Central Banker Backs Universal Bank Model-Paper, REUTERS
(Jan. 16, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/16/swiss-banks-idUSLDE60F050201
00116.
7

See Georg Rich & Christian Walter, The Future of Universal Banking, 13 CATO J. 289
(1993). See generally BANKING, TRADE AND INDUSTRY: EUROPE, AMERICA AND ASIA FROM THE
THIRTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Alice Teichova et al. eds., 1997); Panagiotis K.
Staikouras, Universal Banks, Universal Crises? Disentangling Myths from Realities in Quest of a
New Regulatory and Supervisory Landscape, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 139 (2011). For the Dutch
system, see Christopher Louis Colvin, Universal Banking Failure?: An Analysis of the Contrasting
Responses of the Amsterdamsche Bank and the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging to the Dutch
Financial Crisis of the 1920s (London Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. 98/07, 2007).
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the problems large universal banks pose to economies. It illuminates the role of
good corporate governance for banks in financial regulatory reform. It also
suggests that the rules and practice in corporate governance of banks in the United
States and Europe are converging. Part V touches on the issues of global
regulatory reform to see if the global solution might fit into the structural issues of
financial institutions and systems. It emphasizes the need to develop international
rules for the structure of financial institutions and importance of comparative
financial system and regulation. It also briefly discusses the allocation of
regulatory authority. Part VI concludes.
II.

UNIVERSAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 8

A.

The Issue

Controversy over the separation of commercial and investment banks has
been active since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007. In popular
terms, the issue is whether the United States should reinstate the Glass-Steagall
Act of 1933. 9 The Act was passed after the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the
subsequent collapse of the American banking industry. The number of banks
decreased from 25,000 to 14,000 during the crisis. The Act required the separation
of commercial and investment banks in order to deter deposit-taking commercial
banks from engaging in speculative and risky activities in the capital markets,
which was believed to have been a major cause of the crash. It was not until 1999
when the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA). 10
Twenty-five banks failed in 2008 and 140 banks failed in 2009 in the
United States, whereas only eleven banks had failed between 2002 and 2007.11
8

See generally JORDI CANALS, UNIVERSAL BANKING: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS AND
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (1997); ANTHONY SAUNDERS & INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL
BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES: WHAT COULD WE GAIN? WHAT COULD WE LOSE? (1994);
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963 (2009).
9

Erik M. Filipiak, The Creation of a Regulatory Framework: The Enactment of GlassSteagall (Annual Meeting of the Am. Political Sci. Ass’n,. Meeting Paper, 2009).
10

For the GLBA, see Jolina C. Cuaresma, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 497 (2002); Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services Industry Puts Together Let
No Person Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to the 2008-2009
American Capital Markets Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 371 (2010); Edward J. Janger & Paul M.
Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86
MINN. L. REV. 1219 (2002).
11

Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/
banklist.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
6
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The failure of the financial institutions during the 2008 crisis cast doubts on the
conventional wisdom of “size matters.” Economies of scale and scope can be a
good thing in the competitive market, but they also create the so-called “Too-BigTo-Fail” 12 problem. Commercial banks’ activities related to capital markets have
become too risky and arguably contributed to the collapse of the U.S. and global
financial markets. Should the United States go back to the Glass-Steagall era?
Clearly, America cannot afford another Lehman Brothers failure 13 or Citigroup
bailout. The systemic risk created by large financial institutions has become too
big to manage. 14 The complexity and magnitude of business of the leading
financial institutions have become too great to handle for any first-class
managers. 15 The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act created big financial institutions
in the United States. Desegregation of commercial and investment banking
activities led to increased mergers and acquisitions in the financial services
industry. Some of the largest among them have become too big to fail. Their
businesses are too complicated for any software. The number of employees is so
large that illegal or questionable practices can neither be detected nor easily
controlled. The leading financial institutions went global without sufficient
resources to handle cultural diversities within the organization. 16 Like Japanese
mega-banks 17 they may be overwhelmed by their own size. 18

12

See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES
(2009).
13

For general background on the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008, see generally
LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE (2009); JOSEPH TIBMAN,
THE MURDER OF LEHMAN BROTHERS: AN INSIDER’S LOOK AT THE GLOBAL MELTDOWN (2009);
MARK T. WILLIAMS, UNCONTROLLED RISK (2010) .
14

See George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 16 CATO
J. 17 (1996); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008). See also KERN
ALEXANDER ET AL., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK (2006).
15

See Alan Greenspan, Dodd-Frank Fails to Meet Test of Our Times, FIN. TIMES (March
29, 2011, 6:31 PM ET), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/14662fd8-5a28-11e0-86d3-00144feab49a.html
(“[R]egulators, and for that matter everyone else, can never get more than a glimpse at the internal
workings of the simplest of modern financial systems”).
16

Harold James, Why Big Banks Will Get Bigger, PROJECT SYNDICATE, (Jan. 5, 2010),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/james36/English.
17

See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Good To Be True? The Unfulfilled Promises Behind
Big Bank Mergers, 2 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (1995).
18

Banks expand their businesses internationally. Small economies, however, may face
difficulties if their banks become too big for the size of their economies. Ireland and Iceland are
good examples. Their banks grew big and went international out of the government’s effective
7
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B.

A Brief Chronology 19

1.

Early Years

The modern banking business originated in Italy, representatively by the
House of Medici in the 14th century, preceded by Bardi and Peruzzi of Florence. 20
The Italian mathematician Fibonacci (c. 1170–c. 1250) came up with a new
method of calculating interest, and that stimulated lending which in turn supported
trade. 21 It is not coincidental that Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice was
about the merchants of the 14th century. Soon, the rise of the merchant banks
followed. 22 Merchant banks stayed in close relationship with industrial firms
through trade finance, commercial papers and equity investments. The deposittaking commercial banks are the products and/or companions of these merchant
banks. So, the universal bank can be said to not be a special category of bank;
rather, it is the original form of doing banking business, with the only exception
being in England where banks took almost no equity participation in industrial
firms. 23
Baring Bank is said to be the oldest significant merchant bank in
history. 24 It was founded in England in 1762. By the early 19th century, Baring
control. As a result, the global financial crisis brought their economies down. James, supra note __.
19

See VINCENT CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (1970);
CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY (1997); ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J.
WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW (2007); JOEL SELIGMAN,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3rd ed. 2003).
20

See RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH, PREMODERN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: A HISTORICAL
COMPARATIVE STUDY 145–70 (1987); CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, THE HOUSE OF MEDICI: ITS RISE
AND FALL (1999); TIM PARKS, MEDICI MONEY (2006). Arguably, the first global financial
institution was the Knights Templar. The Templar, Inc. is said to have invented the bill of exchange
and even financed King Louis VII of France in the second crusade. See JACK CASHILL, POPES &
BANKERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CREDIT & DEBT, FROM ARISTOTLE TO AIG 33–40 (2010);
MICHAEL HAAG, THE TEMPLARS: THE HISTORY & THE MYTH 137–44 (2009). For a history of the
Order, see generally MALCOLM BARBER, THE NEW KNIGHTHOOD: A HISTORY OF THE ORDER OF
THE TEMPLE (1995); MICHAEL HAAG, THE TEMPLARS: THE HISTORY AND THE MYTH: FROM
SOLOMON'S TEMPLE TO THE FREEMASONS (2009).
21

See NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD
33–34 (2008).
22

Cf. ERIK BANKS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MERCHANT BANKS (1999); STANLEY
CHAPMAN, THE RISE OF MERCHANT BANKING (2006).
23

MICHEL FLEURIET, INVESTMENT BANKING EXPLAINED 5 (2008).

24

See DAVID S. LANDES, DYNASTIES: FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES OF THE WORLD’S
GREAT FAMILY BUSINESSES 13-36 (2006).
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became the most influential bank in Europe. It grew fast through the revolution
and war financing of British governments. Baring even brokered France’s sale of
the State of Louisiana to the United States in 1803. After Rothschild’s takeover of
the dominant position in European banking by 1820, Baring’s business shrank. It,
however, maintained its reputation as the oldest merchant banking house in
Europe. 25 Rothschild, which started as a competitor to Baring Bank, surpassed
Baring in the early 19th century. 26 Like Baring, Rothschild also grew through
financing activities for dynasties and sovereign governments, particular during
times of war. It was the absolute financial power through the 19th century. More
importantly, it practically midwifed the investment banking industry in the United
States through its agents, most notably August Belmont, who sold railroad bonds
issued by the U.S. firms in Europe.
After the Civil War, the early investment bankers began to underwrite
U.S. railroad stocks to finance the huge industry. They then began to buy and
distribute the stocks to European investors. 27 This was when the American model
of investment banking emerged. They were J.P. Morgan and Company, JW
Seligman and Company, Kuhn Loeb, Kidder Peabody, and PaineWebber. An
oligopolistic industry was born, with J.P. Morgan being the market leader. 28 The
“new generation” house Goldman Sachs was founded only in 1869 by Marcus
Goldman and became a member of the New York Stock Exchange in 1896.
Goldman Sachs established a solid alliance with Lehman Brothers, which was
founded a little earlier in 1850. 29
25

During World War II, the British government again relied upon Baring in securing
financing for war. In 1995, however, one of Baring’s employees in Singapore lost 1.4 billion
dollars in speculative trade. Baring ended up being sold to the Dutch ING for one pound. It finally
disappeared in 2001 after 250 years of history.
26

See NIALL FERGUSON, 1 THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD: MONEY’S PROPHETS: 1798-1848
(1998); NIALL FERGUSON, 2 THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD: THE WORLD’S BANKER: 1849-1999
(1998).
27

But see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 253-54 (2006) (pointing out that “it was not until 1928 that the total value of
publicly traded equity exceeded that of outstanding debt”).
28

Kidder Peabody was established in 1865 and sold to General Electric in 1986, then to
PaineWebber in 1994. PaineWebber was then merged with UBS in 2000. Kuhn Loeb was
founded in 1867 and became the principal rival of J.P.Morgan. But, the house lost significance
after World War II and was sold to Lehman Brothers in 1977. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb was
acquired by American Express in 1984 forming Shearson Lehman American Express.
29

For a history of Goldman Sachs, see CHARLES D. ELLIS, PARTNERSHIP: THE MAKING OF
GOLDMAN SACHS (2009), LISA ENDLICH, GOLDMAN SACHS: THE CULTURE OF SUCCESS (1997),
and SUZANNE MCGEE, CHASING GOLDMAN SACHS (2010). For a history of Lehman Brothers, see
PETER CHAPMAN, THE LAST OF THE IMPERIOUS RICH: LEHMAN BROTHERS, 1844-2008 (2010).
9
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2.

J.P. Moragn and the Glass-Steagall

John Coffee suggested that investment bankers took the role of guardians
for public investors in the early stages of industrialization in the United States. 30
When we read Edward Rock’s fascinating description of the age of robber
barons, 31 it makes perfect sense that American investors badly needed investment
bankers. Railroad companies did not protect minority shareholders through
corporate governance devices. To the contrary, control group quite often
manipulated stock prices. Through corporate governance mechanisms, investment
banks devised a way to credibly make promises to potential investors. For
instance, they had directorships in many banks and general corporations to
monitor managers and businesses. 32
However, the investment banking industry led by J.P. Morgan was soon
feared by the public as it grew too fast and powerful. 33 J.P. Morgan controlled the
entire financial services industry of the time, banking, securities and insurance
included. The financial firms in turn controlled industrial firms. The Pujo
Committee was created in 1912, and the industry was ultimately reorganized by
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. 34 Commercial banking and investment banking
were separated for very political reasons. 35 President Theodore Roosevelt’s
antagonism against the financial industry symbolized by J.P. Morgan played a
crucial role in the process. 36 Americans feared that the financial giant may
jeopardize democracy. 37 J.P. Morgan ended up splitting into Morgan Guaranty
30

John C. Coffee, Jr., Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, the Evidence, and the
Enduring Tension Between ‘Lumpers’ and ‘Splitters’ (European Corporate Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 144/2010, 2010).
31

Edward B. Rock, Encountering the Scarlet Woman of Wall Street: Speculative
Comments at the End of the Century, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 237 (2001).
32

See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 27 – 32 (2001).
33

See RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND
THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE (1990); JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER (2000).
34

See generally GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT
BANKING: THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED (1990).
35

Cf. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE
POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Mark J. Roe, Political
Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000).
36

LANDES, supra note __, at 85–86.

37

Ironically, public opinion in the United States urged J.P. Morgan Chase to rescue Bear
Stearns in 2008. Cashill, supra note __, at 228. For background on J.P. Morgan Chase, see
10
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Trust, Morgan Stanley, 38 and Morgan Grenfell of London. However, it is not
clear if universal banking contributed to the failure of banks during the Great
Depression. The U.S. system did not allow banks to do business outside of the
place of their establishment because of the public sentiment that local money
should go to local borrowers. 39 That prevented American banks from growing
large and small banks were inherently vulnerable to economic crisis.
The Glass-Steagall Act experienced continuous erosion in its normative
power over the years. The U.S. banking industry regarded the Act as a roadblock
in its fierce competition with the European universal banks in the global financial
markets that were characterized by world-wide mergers and acquisitions. 40 The
economies of scope could not be achieved because of the Act. At the same time,
investment banks started to eat away at the traditional businesses of commercial
banks. Junk bonds replaced commercial loans in the 1980s 41 due to the rapid
growth of private equity and leveraged buyouts. 42 The growth of the mutual fund
market was also a huge blow to commercial banks’ lending business. So, banks
became offensive and expanded their business into the capital markets,
challenging the Glass-Steagall Act. Most notably, banks began securities
brokerage and asset management services. Litigation followed. Voluminous case
law and practice were developed in this area. The Supreme Court of the United

MCDONALD, DUFF, LAST MAN STANDING: THE ASCENT OF JAMIE DIMON AND JPMORGAN CHASE
(2009).
38

Cf. PATRICIA BEARD, BLUE BLOOD AND MUTINY: THE FIGHT FOR THE SOUL OF MORGAN
STANLEY (2007).
39

See HOWARD BODENHORN, STATE BANKING IN EARLY AMERICA: A NEW ECONOMIC
HISTORY (2003).
40

See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975 – 2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, U. ILL. L. REV. 215–476 (2002).
41

MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note __, at 295–96.

42

See generally GEORGE ANDERS, MERCHANTS OF DEBT: KKR AND THE MORTGAGING OF
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1992); GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL
CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE (1998);
BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO
(1991); HARRY CENDROWSKI ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS
(2008); PETER G. PETERSON, THE EDUCATION OF AN AMERICAN DREAMER (2009);Brian Cheffins &
John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2008).
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States approved Bank of America’s acquisition of Charles Schwab in 1984 43 and
Bankers Trust’s commercial paper underwriting business in 1986. 44
3.

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley and Industry Consolidation

The 1998 the merger of Citicorp and Travelers highlighted the trend. 45
Citigroup, the largest financial services company in the world, was created
through the stock swap merger of Travelers (which owned SalomonSmithBarney)
and Citicorp, the parent of Citibank. Finally, in 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act was passed and partially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act with the backing of
Alan Greenspan and the Clinton administration. The GLBA allowed commercial
banks to engage in the securities and insurance businesses. 46
Since the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, commercial banks have
aggressively pursued the highly profitable investment banking business.
Commercial banks cited the following reasons for pursuing new fee-based
businesses: first, they felt compelled to offer one-stop shopping for existing
clientele; second, it was regarded as a necessary step to compete with European
universal banks not restrained by regulations; third, cross-selling platforms
appeared attractive; fourth, apparent cost savings were available through
leveraging the existing client and industry knowledge base; and fifth, as
competition intensified, they could provide credit to win capital markets
business. 47 On the side of investment banking business, spreads narrowed and,
accordingly, economies of scale increased. Computers and information
technologies became increasingly powerful and sophisticated, specialized
investment banking houses badly needed capital to operate at a commercial scale.
Some of them were absorbed by commercial banks. 48

43

Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 137 (1984); John S. Zieser, Note,
Security Under the Glass-Steagall Act: Analyzing the Supreme Court’s Framework for
Determining Permissible Bank Activity, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1194 (1985).
44

See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The
Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672 (1987).
45

See AMEY STONE & MIKE BREWSTER, KING OF CAPITAL: SANDY WEILL AND THE
MAKING OF CITIGROUP 229 (2002).
46

See Faith Neale & Pamela Peterson, The Effect of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on the
Insurance Industry (Fla. State Univ., Working Paper, 2003).
47

See PowerPoint, William T. Sherman, Conditions and Trends in the Investment Banking
Industry: Presentation to the World Services Group, Inc., WORLD SERVICES GROUP 8 (May 7,
2004), http://www.worldservicesgroup.com/powerpoint/Sherman.ppt.
48

See MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note __, at 279.
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Only a couple of industry leaders remain solely focused on investment
banking. Universal banks appear to be better positioned given their size and
access to capital; however, such pure investment banks like Goldman Sachs and
Lehman Brothers have maintained their market share since 1996. Universal banks
like Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase experienced difficulty in integrating and
aligning banking, sales and trading, and research. Pure investment banks were
also well capitalized and were not handicapped for lack of capital (i.e. block
trades) because most of them went public, 49 and credit relationships both helped
and hurt. 50
C.

Reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act?

Much has been written on the global financial crisis. 51 This is not the
place to repeat it. The financial crisis of 2008 occurred when banks and other
financial institutions took huge risks. Several of the world's oldest and largest
financial institutions collapsed or were on the verge of doing so. Government
bailouts followed, but markets plummeted and credit dried up. The whole
financial system was led to near collapse. Financial products like credit default
swaps and other financial derivatives became the target of public outrage. The
crisis ignited discussions on the business model of financial services firms as it
relates to the soundness of the financial system and the safety of the entire
economy. As the crisis was international in nature, discussions have been made
worldwide through international stages like the G20.
49

See id., at 237 – 238. For the IPO of Goldman Sachs, see ENDLICH, supra note __, at 415

50

Sherman, supra note __, at 13.

– 426.
51

See generally WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS (2009); STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF,
GODS AT WAR (2009); DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO
THE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND CONTRACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009); ALAN C. GREENBERG,
THE RISE AND FALL OF BEAR STEARNS (2010); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF WALL STREET
(2010); DUFF MCDONALD, LAST MAN STANDING: THE ASCENT OF JAMIE DIMON AND JPMORGAN
CHASE (2009); HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK (2010); ANDREW SHENG, FROM ASIAN TO
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009); GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD (2009); DAVID WESSEL, IN FED
WE TRUST (2009); Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1151 (2010); John C. Coffee, What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the
2008 Financial Crisis, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 1 (2009). For German literature on the global financial
crisis, see Bernd Rudolph, Die internationale Finanzkrise: Ursachen, Treiber, Veränderungsbedarf
und Reformansätze, 39 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 1 (2010)
(Ger.). For the author’s account in the Korean language on which some parts of this article draws,
see Kim Hwa-Jin, Eunhaeng-ui jibaegujo-wa eunhaeng isa-ui bupryuljeog chaeg-im [Corporate
Governance of Banks and Bank Director Liability], 51-4 SEOUL L.J. 151 (2010) and Kim Hwa-Jin,
Geul-lobeol geum-yung-wigi-wa geum-yungsan-eob-ui gujojaepyeon [The Financial Services
Industry in the Global Financial Crisis: History and Strategies], 51-3 SEOUL L.J. 125 (2010).
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1.

Pros

Many blame the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act as one factor leading to
the financial crisis. 52 They believe that allowing commercial and investment
banks to combine led to the current crisis, and that re-mandating separation would
prevent a repeat of the financial crisis. 53 Allowing commercial banks to engage in
risky capital market related activities, while protecting them from failure through
deposit insurance and access to the Federal Reserve Bank’s discount window,
created a moral hazard problem 54 and an appetite for larger risks. Therefore,
“some kind of separation between institutions that deal primarily in the capital
markets and those involved in more traditional deposit-taking and working-capital
finance makes sense.” 55
Another argument in favor of reinstating the Glass-Steagall Act is that
conflicts of interest may become more serious when commercial and investment
banking activities are consolidated into a single financial institution, 56
considering that conflicts of interest is by far the single most important issue for
big investment banks. 57 Conflicts of interest within big banks are too complicated
52

See, e.g., Nouriel Roubini & Arnab Das, Solutions for a Crisis in Its Sovereign Stage,
FIN. TIMES (May 31, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8eda2c3e-6cde-11df-91c8-00144feab49a.
html.
53

See Louis Uchitelle, Elders of Wall St. Favor More Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2010, at B1
54

John H. Boyd et al., Moral Hazard Under Commercial and Universal Banking, 30 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING __ (1998).
55

David Wessel, John Reed on Glass Steagall: Then and Now, Blog post on Real Time
Economics, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2009, 4:27 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/10/27/
john-reed-on-glass-steagall-then-now/.
56

See Georg Rich & Christian Walter, The Future of Universal Banking, 13 CATO J. 289,
306 (1993). For conflicts of interest, see generally ANDREW CROCKETT ET AL., CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY: WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT THEM? (2003);
Daylian M. Cain, The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest,
34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005); Susanna Leong, Protection of Confidential Information Acquired
from a Former Client: Are Chinese Walls Adequate?, 11 SING. ACAD. L.J. 444 (1999); Norman S.
Poser, Conflicts of Interest Within Securities Firms, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 111 (1990); Andrew
Tuch, Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest, 29 MELB. U. L. REV.
478 (2005); Peter G. Klein & Kathrin Zoeller, Universal Banking and Conflicts of Interests:
Evidence from German Initial Public Offerings (Contracting & Org. Research Inst., Working Paper
No. 03-06, 2003).
57

For conflicts of interest issues in takeovers, see Klaus J. Hopt, Takeovers, Secrecy, and
Conflicts of Interest: Problems for Boards and Banks (European Corporate Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 03/2002, 2002) and Charles W. Calomiris & Hal J. Singer, How Often Do
“Conflicts of Interests” in the Investment Banking Industry Arise During Hostile Takeovers? (Feb.
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to control successfully. There are many empirical studies that support the conflicts
of interest concern. 58
Also, segregation of commercial and investment banking activities may
be the way to address behavioral factors that can lead to global financial chaos. It
is argued that segregation is the only way to prevent socio-psychological aspects
of market behavior from leading to homogenization in global financial markets. 59
Segregating financial institutions along business lines would prevent
homogenization of financial markets on an international level, and thus reduce the
potential for a local financial crisis to grow into a global one. 60
2.

Cons

Conventional wisdom is that universal banks can provide consumers with
a greater range of services and tend to have greater capital reserves to protect
consumers against unanticipated losses. The universal banking structure provides
economies of scale and scope to banks that enable them to offer services to
customers at a lower price. 61 It creates synergies as the use of deposits as a cheap
source of funds may be employed across the border of the commercial banking
business. 62 Universal banks are also better able to diversify risk. So some
economists, banks, and powerful financial lobbies, including the Committee on
24, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=509562.
58

See Wolfgang Bessier & Matthias Stanzel, Conflicts of Interest and Research Quality of
Affiliated Analysts in the German Universal Banking System: Evidence from IPO Underwriting, 15
EUR. FIN. MGMT. 757 (2009); Hedva Ber et al., Conflict of Interest in Universal Banking: Bank
Lending, Stock Under-writing, and Fund Management Abstract (Ctr. For Econ. Policy Research,
Discussion Paper No. 2359, 2000); Klein & Zoeller, supra note 52., available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=223085;
59

See Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance and
Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 23 (2009). Avgouleas
explains homogenization as “the widespread tendency of market players to move all in the same
direction at once.” Id. at 28. Homogenization harms global financial markets by leading to
“marked lack of pluralism in trading strategies and investment diversification, significantly
increasing endogenous risk” and “depriv[ing] the global financial system from the balance
provided by investment and financial activity diversification.” Id. at 48.
60

See Avgouleas, supra note 55, at 48.

61

Even commercial firms try to enter into the financial services industry. See Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539
(2007) (urging Congress to enact legislation to prohibit acquisitions of FDIC-insured industrial
loan companies by commercial firms).
62

INT’L BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, A SURVEY OF CURRENT
REGULATORY TRENDS 23 (2010) [hereinafter ‘IBA Report’].
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Capital Markets Regulation 63 and Paul Krugman, 64 argue against regulation that
newly requires the separation of commercial and investment banking. It has been
strongly suggested that there is no connection between the failure of universal
banking and the financial crisis. The U.S. banks failed due to the deterioration of
their commercial banking businesses. Reinstating the Glass-Steagall divide would
be unnecessary for financial reform because repeal of the Act neither caused nor
worsened the financial crisis. 65 After all, it was the bad lending practices and the
subprime mortgage business, the core of commercial banking, that served as the
primary causes of the financial crisis. 66 Regulations must therefore target bad
lending practices that lie at the root of the financial crisis.
Although the Glass-Steagall Act 67 prohibited commercial banks from
underwriting or dealing in mortgage-backed securities (MBS), the Act never
prohibited commercial banks from buying and selling MBS as investment
securities. 68 Thus, banks suffered losses from acting in their capacity as
commercial banks, not from acting as securities firms. GLBA simply permitted
securities firms and commercial banks to be affiliated with each other. It is
unlikely that a bank securities affiliate or subsidiary of a commercial bank could
significantly harm the financial condition of the commercial bank. 69 To be sure,
the expansion of commercial banks’ business areas over the years was also made
possible through market practices and permissive policies of the administration
and judiciary while the Glass-Steagall Act was still in force. Therefore, it may
well be argued that the differences in detail between the Glass-Steagall and
GLBA 70 are not significant. However, the repeal of Glass-Steagall, if not in its
entirety, could have sent certain signals to the market and industries. The financial

63

COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A PLAN FOR
REGULATORY REFORM 191–95 (2009).
64

Paul Krugman, Glass-Steagall, Part Deux, Blog post on The Conscience of a Liberal,
N.Y. TIMES(Jan. 21, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/glass-steagalpart-deux/.
65

Peter J. Wallison, Did the “Repeal” of Glass-Steagall Have Any Role in the Financial
Crisis? Not Guilty. Not Even Close 14–15 (Networks Fin. Inst. at Ind. State U., Policy Brief 2009PB-09, 2009).
66

HAL S. SCOTT, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 108–09 (2009).

67

For a good summary, see Ehud Ofer, Glass-Steagall: The American Nightmare That
Became the Israeli Dream, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 527, 528–42 (2004).
68

Wallison, supra note 4, at 6.

69

Id. at 16-17.

70

For a good summary, see Ofer, supra note __, at 543–50.
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services industry may have taken advantage of the changes. In practice, 100
percent-owned subsidiaries may be run as business units within one firm.
The conflicts of interest problem with universal banking may have been
exaggerated, and can be controlled through proper regulatory measures. 71 One
study shows that the conflicts of interest issue that was controversial at the time of
the enactment of Glass-Steagall was in fact exaggerated. 72 It goes further and
argues that the universal banking system was more effective in controlling the
conflicts of interest because of the sensitivity of universal banks’ reputation. 73
Opponents of reinstating Glass-Steagall propose such alternative forms of
financial regulation to further financial reform as limiting the amount of assets a
single financial institution may hold and to increase capital requirements of
financial institutions. Regulation should also focus on banks’ risk-taking activity,
not on the size, and should mandate higher capital requirements relative to risktaking activity and impose limits on leverage ratios. 74 Canada is a good example
of that approach. Proponents of universal banking, i.e., opponents of reinstating
Glass-Steagall, highlight Canada as evidence that universal banking does not have
inherent structural weaknesses and would not necessarily lead to financial crisis.
Canada adopts the universal banking model, and Canada’s banking industry is
dominated by five large banks that represent ninety percent of the market. 75
However, no Canadian bank failed during the global financial crisis. This can be
attributed to alternative forms of regulation, including tighter lending standards,
lower leverage ratios, and better regulatory oversight. 76
D.

The Volcker-Rule

1.

A Compromise

Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act is also known as the Merkley-Levin
provisions on proprietary trading and conflicts of interest or simply as the
“Volcker Rule.” 77 It adds a new Section 13 to the Bank Holding Company Act of
71

BENSTON, supra note __, at 309–10.

72

Id. at 43–122.

73

Id. at 205–11.

74

Big Banks Needn’t Be Bad Banks, ECON. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2010), http://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/international-business/big-banks-neednt-be-badbanks/articleshow/5536770.cms.
75

Id.

76

Id.

77

See generally, Andrew F. Tuch, Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcer Rule and Goldman
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1956. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker believed that commercial
banks’ risk-taking activities needed to be constrained. He had been arguing that
commercial banks should be prevented from taking advantage of the safety net
provided by the government to make speculative investments. 78 Volcker
proposed a new financial reform, which restores the “spirit” of the Glass-Steagall
Act, but not the Act itself. 79 President Obama endorsed this reform and named it
the “Volcker Rule.” Rather than recreating a wall between commercial and
investment banking, the Volcker Rule forbids commercial banks from owning or
investing in hedge funds, private equity funds, and from engaging in proprietary
trading. 80 According to Simon Johnson, “[m]ismanagement of risks that involved
effectively betting the banks’ own capital was central to the financial crisis of
2008.” 81 The Volcker Rule would “significantly reduce systemic financial risks
looking forward.” Furthermore, the “separation between banks and the funds they
sponsor, in any fashion, needs to be complete.” 82 President Obama articulated the
thinking behind the rule:
“[W]e should no longer allow banks to stray too far from their
central mission of serving their customers. In recent years, too many
financial firms have put taxpayer money at risk by operating hedge funds
and private equity funds and making riskier investments to reap a quick
reward. And these firms have taken these risks while benefiting from
special financial privileges that are reserved only for banks. Our
government provides deposit insurance and other safeguards and
Sachs (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 37, April 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809271.
78

See David Cho & Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama’s ‘Volcker Rule’ Shifts Power Away
from Geithner, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/ 2010/01/21/AR2010012104935.html?sid=ST2010012104948.
79

See Damian Paletta & Jonathan Weisman, Proposal Set to Curb Bank Giants, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 21, 2010, 1:16 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870432010457501
5910344117800.html.
80

It provides that no “banking entity” may “acquire or retain any equity, partnership, or
other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a private equity fund.” The Volcker-Rule is
expected to become effective on July 21, 2012. See CLIFFORD CHANCE, IMPACT OF THE “VOLCKER
RULE” ON NON-U.S. BANK INVESTMENTS IN PRIVATE EQUITY AND HEDGE FUNDS OUTSIDE THE
UNITED STATES 2 (2010). For proprietary trading, see generally MIKE BELLAFIORE, ONE GOOD
TRADE: INSIDE THE HIGHLY COMPETITIVE WORLD OF PROPRIETARY TRADING (2010).
81

See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, THIRTEEN BANKERS: THE WALL STREET
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010).
82

Letter from Simon Johnson, Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship,
Massachusetts Insitute of Technnology, to the Members of the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (November 5, 2010).
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guarantees to firms that operate banks. We do so because a stable and
reliable banking system promotes sustained growth, and because we
learned how dangerous the failure of that system can be during the Great
Depression. But these privileges were not created to bestow banks
operating hedge funds or private equity funds with an unfair
advantage. When banks benefit from the safety net that taxpayers
provide –- which includes lower-cost capital –- it is not appropriate for
them to turn around and use that cheap money to trade for profit. And
that is especially true when this kind of trading often puts banks in direct
conflict with their customers' interests. The fact is, these kinds of trading
operations can create enormous and costly risks, endangering the entire
bank if things go wrong. We simply cannot accept a system in which
hedge funds or private equity firms inside banks can place huge, risky
bets that are subsidized by taxpayers and that could pose a conflict of
interest. And we cannot accept a system in which shareholders make
money on these operations if the bank wins but taxpayers foot the bill if
the bank loses.” 83
The Volcker Rule requires that large banks cease to conduct proprietary
trading and significantly limit their private-fund investments to three percent of
the Basel II Tier 1 capital. The original version of the Rule stipulated a total ban
on commercial banks’ private-fund investments. Banks have at maximum a
seven-year grace period to comply with the Rule. Commercial banks can do
certain derivative businesses only through their subsidiaries although this is not
included in the Volcker Rule. 84
As for the restructuring of the financial services industry, President
Obama articulated the thinking behind a rule that limits the size of single financial
institution:
“[A]s part of our efforts to protect against future crises, I'm also
proposing that we prevent the further consolidation of our financial
system. There has long been a deposit cap in place to guard against too
much risk being concentrated in a single bank. The same principle
should apply to wider forms of funding employed by large financial
institutions in today's economy. The American people will not be served
83

See supra note 2.

84

For a good summary, see Bradley K. Sabel, Volcker Rule Continues to Garner Outsized
Attention, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION (October 31, 2010, 9:46 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/10/31/
volcker-rule-continues-to-garner-outsized-attention/.
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by a financial system that comprises just a few massive firms. That's not
good for consumers; it's not good for the economy. And through this
policy, that is an outcome we will avoid.” 85
The Volcker Rule includes the measures that curb the size of banks. 86
Mergers and acquisitions amongst banks will be allowed only to the extent that
combined liabilities did not exceed ten percent of the entire liabilities of all banks.
This rule in fact may raise concern outside the United States in terms of mergers
and acquisitions. 87 However, most mergers and acquisitions would not surpass
the rule. 88
2.

International Reach

The Volcker Rule covers both U.S. banking groups and non-U.S. banking
groups with U.S. banking operations. 89 The rule applies to “banking entities.” A
banking entity includes any company that is treated as a bank holding company
for purposes of Section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978 and any
subsidiary or affiliate of that entity, e.g., foreign banks with U.S.-based branches
and agencies. Accordingly, the rule affects virtually every major commercial and
investment bank worldwide. 90 To be sure, as there is no ability for a U.S.
institution to shift business abroad to avoid the rule, foreign institutions might
enjoy an advantage if they do business solely outside the United States. 91 Alan
Greenspan also has recently pointed out that U.S. offices of foreign institutions
could readily switch proprietary trading to European and Asian, even Canadian

85

See supra note 2.

86

See generally Michael J. Aiello & Heath P. Tarbert, Bank M&A in the Wake of DoddFrank, 127 BANKING L. J. 909 (2010).
87

How compliance with the Volcker Rule should be monitored and enforced is also a big
question. See Simon Johnson, Proprietary Traders Earn `Trust, but Verify,' BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7,
2010, 9:00 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-08/proprietary-traders-earnedtrust-but-verify-simon-johnson.html.
88

See Matthew Richardson et al., Large Banks and the Volcker Rule, in: REGULATING
WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 181,
196 (VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL. EDS., 2011) (noting that only Bank of America and JPMorgan
Chase were to reach the threshold).
89

The Dodd-Frank Act has been criticized for neglecting the international dimensions of
the new financial order. See DAVID A. SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE
DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 175–76 (2010).
90

Sabel, supra note __.

91

Id. See also, Richardson et al., supra note __, at 207.
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banks. 92 Also, non-U.S. financial institutions covered by the Volcker Rule would
generally be allowed to continue making investments and conduct private equity
and hedge fund operations outside the United States if they are not controlled by a
U.S. institution and do not sell ownership interest in the private equity or hedge
fund to a U.S. resident. 93
However, any significant non-U.S. financial institution has business
interests in one way or another within the United States. Therefore, the Volcker
Rule would have greater impact on the businesses of non-U.S. financial
institutions than the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did on the corporate governance
of non-U.S. firms. Non-U.S. firms listed on a U.S. stock exchange are exempt
from many, though not all, of the corporate governance requirements under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, provided that they disclose the differences between their
home country corporate governance practices compared to those applicable to U.S.
companies. 94 Such exemptions may not be available under the Dodd-Frank Act
because it is not about foreign securities listed on a U.S. stock exchange, but
about doing actual business in the United States.
III.

UNIVERSAL BANKING IN EUROPE

In the United States, the basic institutional framework established by the
GLBA that allows universal banking will remain valid notwithstanding the new
constraints introduced by the Volcker-Rule. The U.S. financial institutions will
keep moving toward universal banking to achieve economies of scale and scope
as soon as the restructuring of the financial services industry becomes complete.
The discussions below put the developments in the United States in comparative
perspective with the European system.
A.

A European Volcker-Rule?

When the U.S. plan, including the Volcker Rule, was first publicized in
early 2010, European Union finance ministers opposed the U.S. proposal to limit
banks’ size and risk-taking. The Volcker Rule in the European Union might not be
consistent with the current principles of the internal market and universal
banking. 95 The Credit Institutions Directive of 2000 clearly adopted the universal
92

See Greenspan, supra note __.

93

For detailed discussions, see CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note __ and Sabel, supra note __.

94

See, e.g., SEC Rule 10A-3(b)(iv), 10A-3(c).

95

Meera Louis & Jurjen van de Pol, EU Finance Ministers to Resist Obama Plans for
Banking Overhaul, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Feb 14, 2010, 6:42 PM EST), http://www.
businessweek.com/news/2010-02-14/eu-finance-ministers-to-resist-obama-plans-for-bankingoverhaul.html. According to Simon Johnson, Europe faced serious difficulties because of failures
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banking model in the European Union. 96 In particular, the British Financial
Services Minister Paul Myners suggested that he would prefer a capital
requirement approach like the Basel Committee rules to the structural changes
proposed by the United States to address risky bank trading activities. Curbing the
size of big banks was not the best way to make the system safer. 97 Germany and
France also signaled that they would not follow the U.S. guidelines, raising
concerns about banks coming to Europe to conduct their risky activities. 98 If
European banks were to be broken up or if their universal banking system was to
be abandoned, they would be needlessly squandering one of their strengths. The
European countries do not pay great attention to the Volker Rule’s restraints on
commercial banks’ hedge fund and private equity investments because of the
insignificant volume of businesses in those areas. 99
On the other hand, the European Parliament adopted new rules for hedge
funds and private equity in November 2010. 100 The directive does not specifically
govern banks’ hedge funds and private equity-related activities. It generally
regulates those industries. Under the new rules, capital and disclosure
requirements will be imposed on fund managers across the European Union.
Managers will have to comply with such rules as covering, depositary
arrangements, and pay and capital distributions. From January 2013, approved
fund managers will be allowed to market their funds across the EU with the EU
Passport, rather than continue to seek approval on a member country-by-member
country basis. The EU Passport may be extended also to fund managers outside
the member countries, including those in the United States, from 2015. Put these
developments together with the Volcker Rule, and the U.S. banks may be a little
to control the behavior of major banks. See Johnson, supra note __, at __.
96

Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, 2000 J.O. (L 126) 1.
97

Huw Jones, Britain Studying High-Frequency Trading Concerns, REUTERS (Feb. 3,
2010,
6:13
AM
EST),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/03/regulation-mynersidUSLDE6120UU20100203? pageNumber=1.
98

Id.

99

Ronald Orol, European Delegation Reveals Rift on Volcker Rule, Bank Tax,
MARKETWATCH (June 8, 2010, 7:00 PM EDT), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/europeandelegation-reveals-rift-on-volcker-rule-2010-06-08. Cf. Eilís Ferran, Regulation of Private EquityBacked Leveraged Buyout Activity in Europe (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law
Working Paper No. 84/2007, 2007).
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Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative
Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2004/39/EC and 2009/…/EC, COM (2009)
207 final (Apr. 30, 2009). See Press Release, European Parliament, Parliament Ushers in New EU
Rules for Hedge Funds and Private Equity (Nov. 11, 2010).
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disadvantaged in the alternative investment sector. The developments and new
rules, however, have been criticized as opportunistic as the reform had little real
connection to the global financial crisis, simply taking advantage of the inevitable
regulatory backlash after the crisis. 101
A Brief Chronology 102

B.

Investment banking in Europe originated in France. French banks were
founded as universal banks in the early 1800s. Crédit Mobilier and Union
Générale were the examples. 103 However, after Crédit Lyonnais and Société
Générale decided to disengage themselves from universal banking, 104 Germany
and Switzerland became the places where universal banks grew large. 105
Especially in Germany, investment banking came to play a more important role in
financing industrial firms than anywhere else in Europe. Although the capital
markets were not well developed in these states, banks remained very close to the
industrial firms. Banks owned, supported and controlled the industrial firms.
1.

Germany

In 1848, Schaafhausenscher Bankverein was founded in Cologne. It was
followed by Deutsche Bank 106 and Commerzbank in 1870, and Dresdner Bank107
in 1872. These banks were typical of universal banks run in close cooperation of
industrial firms. 108 For instance, the family members of Siemens served on the
101

See Eilís Ferran, The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity: A Case Study in
the Development of the EU’s Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis (European Corporate
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 176/2011, 2011).
102

See JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE
FINANCE (1997); NIALL FERGUSON, THE CASH NEXUS: MONEY AND POWER IN THE MODERN
WORLD, 1700–2000 (2001); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN
EUROPE (1984).
103

FLEURIET, supra note __, at 7.

104

FLEURIET, supra note __, at 8.

105

See J. Edwards & S. Ogilvie, Universal Banks and German Industrialization: A
Reappraisal, 49 ECON. HIST. REV. 427 (1996); Caroline Fohlin, Regulation, Taxation, and the
Development of the German Universal Banking System, 1884-1913, 6 EUR. REV, ECON. HIST. 221
(2002).
106

For a history of Deutsche Bank, see LOTHAR GALL, DIE DEUTSCHE BANK 1870-1995
(1995) (Ger.).
107

For a history of Dresdner Bank, see 1-4 DIE DRESDNER BANK IM DRITTEN REICH
(Klaus-Dietmar Henke ed., 2006) (Ger.).
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See Robert B. H. Hauswald, On the Origins of Universal Banking: An Analysis of the
German Banking Sector 1848 to 1910 (1998) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/
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board of directors of Deutsche Bank when the bank was established, and Deutsche
Bank has remained the house bank (Hausbank) of Siemens even until today. 109
During the Great Depression in the United States, U.S. banks called in
loans made to Europe. The then largest bank in Austria, Creditanstalt, went under
in 1931. Creditanstalt was founded by Rothschild in 1855 in Vienna. Panicked by
the incident, Germany introduced exchange control after shutting down all banks
for two days. German banks were eventually nationalized by Adolf Hitler in 1933.
Deutsche Bank was the largest bank in the world before World War I.
After the foundation, it underwrote bonds issued by Krupp, and brought Bayer to
the Berlin Stock Exchange. After the War, however, it fell with the Weimar
Republic. As Hitler came to power in 1933, Deutsche Bank discharged three
Jewish directors and took part in the confiscation of Jewish property. It financed
the Nazi’s secret police, Gestapo, as well as the construction of the concentration
camp in Auschwitz. It became the house bank of IG Farben, Hitler’s war
machine. 110 After World War II, it was divided into ten local banks and it was not
until 1957 when it was reinstated in Frankfurt. Deutsche Bank has been a
universal bank since its establishment. But, its character has been a commercial
bank largely due to the nature of a bank-centered German economy. From 1989
on, however, Deutsche Bank has been aggressively expanding to the investment
banking business along with the quick rise of the capital markets in Germany. In
the same year, it acquired Morgan Grenfell and became a serious figure in the
world investment banking industry. In 1999, Deutsche Bank acquired Bankers
Trust, which acquired Alex Brown in 1997. Alex Brown was founded in 1800 and
said to be the oldest investment banking house in the United States. In October
2001, Deutsche Bank was listed on the New York Stock Exchange as the first
firm listed after 9/11. Joseph Ackermann, who succeeded Rolf Breuer in May
2002, started an aggressive campaign to change the character of the bank. His
appointment to the head position of Deutsche Bank was due to his success in the
investment banking operation of the bank. He even considered moving the bank’s
headquarters to London. 111 Deutsche Bank acquired the Russian UFG (United
Financial Group) in 2006.

sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6696.
109

FLEURIET, supra note __, at 8–9.

110

IG Farben used to be the fourth largest company in the world after GM, U.S. Steel, and
Standard Oil. It was created through the merger of six firms, including BASF, Bayer, Hoechst and
Agfa in 1925. See DIARMUID JEFFREYS, HELL’S CARTEL: IG FARBEN AND THE MAKING OF
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Germany has been a bank-centered economy with less-developed capital
markets. 112 Therefore, German banks, although being universal banks, have been
commercial banks in nature. However, things have changed since the 1980s due to
the integration of capital markets from around the world and the economic
integration of Europe. German banks have been trying to develop investment
banking businesses, Deutsche Bank being the most notable example. The number
of mergers and acquisitions amongst banks has also been increasing. 113 German
industrial firms have historically been under the practical control of German
banks. It was understood as the secret of success and competition of the German
economy. The German system was seriously studied by American scholars until at
least the 1990s. 114 However, the ownership of industrial firms by the banks was
an obstacle for German banks in their strategy to develop investment banking
businesses. Through the German banking industry’s request, the German
government enacted legislation (Steuersenkungsgesetz) in July 2000 to waive
capital gains tax for German banks’ disposal of shares in industrial firms. 115 One
of the strengths of universal banking is that the ownership in industrial firms gives
access to corporate information. This, however, became unimportant in the age of
mandatory disclosure, financial transparency and digital information 116 while
conflicts of interest remained.

ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, May 11, 2002, at 15 (Ger.).
112

Industrial firms finance largely through commercial loans in a bank-centered economy.
Loans are extended on a face-to-face basis. In crisis, parties talk, negotiate, and find solutions. On
the contrary, in a capital markets-centered economy, parties do not know who the counterparties
are. Firms finance through liquid securities and securitizations. In crisis, it is very difficult to find
solutions through communications.
113

See Michael Koetter, Evaluating the German Bank Merger Wave (Utrecht Sch. of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 05-16, 2005).
114

See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan,
and the United States, 102 YALE L.J.1927 (1993). One study found that “firm performance
improved to the extent that equity control rights are concentrated.” And, “bank control rights from
equity ownership significantly improved firm performance beyond what nonbank block-holders
can achieve.” Banks did not extract private value to the detriment of firm performance – German
banks did not seek rent. It diagnoses that “perhaps this explains the German success despite of the
ownership concentration.” Ownership concentration in the hands of financial institutions (not
individuals or families) may not be that bad. The U.S. decision for weak banks might have been
wrong after all. According to this research, “there was no evidence of conflicts of interest between
banks and other shareholders.” See Gary Gorton & Frank Schmid, Universal Banking and the
Performance of German Firms, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 29 (2000).
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BUS. WK., Nov. 19, 2001, at 31.
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(October 29, 2001), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/james2/English.
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2.

Switzerland

The banking industry in Switzerland was created in the 14th century in the
Geneva area. By the end of the 18th century, Switzerland became one of the
international financial power houses of Europe. The neutrality of Switzerland
made it possible to avoid involvement in wars and other armed conflicts. Ever
since the Vienna Conference of 1815, Switzerland has maintained neutrality.
Though it became a member of the United Nations in 2002, Switzerland has not
joined the European Union. The neutrality of Switzerland was well preserved
even during World War II. 117 Its geopolitical stability attracted capital from
around the world. 118 This has been made possible partly because Switzerland
maintained strong armed forces. 119 Mark Roe points out that Switzerland’s
financial markets are unlike those in other civil law jurisdiction as by 1999, Swiss
stock market capitalization as a fraction of its GNP exceeded that of the UK and
the United States, and Switzerland was not occupied in the 20th century. 120 With
no deficits, Switzerland became an exporter of capital. The major importer of
Swiss money was French aristocrats and monarchs. This contributed to the
development of the Geneva area. 121 When the wave of the industrial revolution
reached Switzerland in 1850, big banks emerged in the country to finance the
railroads. In the 1890s, power and tourist industries took off, creating more big
banks.
When the Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in the United States,
Switzerland followed the U.S. model, along with Belgium, Italy and Sweden.
Commercial banking and investment banking remained separated until the 1960s
in Switzerland. 122 Like German banks, Swiss banks have also been commercial
banks in nature, 123 but they have recently been strengthening investment banking
activities in order to compete against U.S. financial institutions. Their core
117

Cf. Detlev F. Vagts, Switzerland, International Law and World War II, 91 AM. J. INT’L L.
466 (1997).
118

See INDEP. COMM. OF EMINENT PERS., REPORT ON DORMANT ACCOUNTS OF VICTIMS OF
NAZI PERSECUTION IN SWISS BANKS (1999); GREGG J. RICKMAN, SWISS BANKS AND JEWISH SOULS
(1999).
119

Vagts, supra note __, at 469.

120

See Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV.
460, 509 – 510 (2006).
121

ANDREAS BUSCH, BANKING REGULATION AND GLOBALIZATION 164–65 (2009).

122

FLEURIET, supra note __, at 14.

123

Ernst Kilgus, Universal Banking Abroad: The Case of Switzerland, in SAUNDERS &
WALTER, supra note __, at 245.
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strategy was to acquire investment banking houses in the United States. Most
notably, Credit Suisse acquired First Boston in 1978, and became Credit Suisse
First Boston (CSFB). CSFB became Credit Suisse in January 2006. Swiss Bank
Corporation (SBC) acquired the British Warburg 124 and U.S. Dillon Read in 1994
and 1997, respectively. SBC merged with Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) in
1998, and became United Bank of Switzerland (UBS). Warburg and Dillon Read
became UBS’ investment banking arm. UBS’ business is larger in the United
States than it is in Switzerland.
C.

Developments Since the 2008 Crisis

1.

Germany 125

In Germany, specialized and local banks, not the large national banks,
were hit first by the global financial crisis. In 2007, IKB (IKB Deutsche
Industriebank) was bailed out by receiving government money in the amount of
1.8 billion Euros and issuing convertible bonds and shares to KfW. KfW ended up
owning ninety percent of IKB at the end of the day before it sold IKB shares to
Lone Star, the Texas-based private equity firm, for 600 million Euros in October
2008, losing more than eight billion Euros. IKB had invested heavily in structured
securities through taking excessive leverage and short-term financing since 2001.
Hypo Real Estate Holding (HRE) was next to get into trouble. By the end of 2007,
HRE’s assets amounted to 400 billion Euros with heavy investments in CDOs
related to the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market. HRE’s Irish subsidiary, the Irish
Depfa Bank, could not continue to refinance its long-term assets. By September of
2008, it became clear that HRE’s failure could ruin Germany’s whole banking
system. A bailout package in the amount of fifty billion Euros was arranged which
increased to 100 billion Euros thereafter. It also turned out that the European
financial supervisory system had cracks. As an Irish-licensed bank, Depfa was not
subject to the direct supervision of BaFin, the German financial supervisory
authority. In 2008, WestLB recorded trading losses of 600 million Euros in 2007
and transferred bad assets worth twenty-three billion Euros to a special investment
vehicle to remove them from its balance sheet. Again in October 2009, WestLB’s
troubled assets with a nominal value of seventy-seven billion Euros were
transferred into a bad bank for liquidation. HSH Nordbank (HSH) ended up
possessing seventeen billion Euros of troubled real estate assets. It received a
government guarantee worth thirty billion Euros. Some other Landesbanken
followed suit.

124

For a history of Warburg, see RON CHERNOW, THE WARBURGS (1994).

125

See IBA Report, at 89–116.
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Ultimately, the big banks could not avoid the crisis. In January 2009,
Commerzbank acquired Dresdner Bank from Allianz for 9.8 billion Euros while
the German government provided Commerzbank with 8.2 billion Euros for
twenty-five percent plus one share in the bank through the Special Fund for
Financial Markets Stabilization (Sonderfond Finanzmarktstabilisierung: SoFFin)
which was created by the Financial Markets Stabilization Act (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz) of 2008 and placed under the administration of a special federal
agency Finanzmarktstabilisierungsanstalt (FMSA). 126 SoFFin was equipped with
100 billion Euros cash plus up to 400 billion Euros guarantee issuing authority.
The German Stock Corporation Act was partially preempted by the Act on the
Acceleration of Financial Market Stabilization (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsbeschleunigungsgesetz) to allow the troubled financial institution to issue new
shares to the government without negotiating with the shareholders. The deal was
also influenced by the new German restriction on foreign investment. 127
Commerzbank managed to acquire Dresdner Bank even though China
Development Bank made a higher bid. However, the merger between
Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank led to a lawsuit by the shareholders against
their managers. 128
The universal banking model incorporated in the European Union Credit
Institutions Directive of 2000 was heavily influenced by Germany. The trouble,
however, is that the German model completely integrates the commercial banking
and securities business into one house in such a way that the central bank might
become reluctant to play the role of the lender of last resort as far as the securities
businesses are concerned. This was what happened in Germany in 2008. The
depositors were highly concerned with the insolvency of the banks and therefore
started to run on their banks. On October 4, 2008, the German government was
forced to offer an unlimited guarantee for all private bank deposits. 129 To
convince the depositors that the commercial banking part of the universal bank
would not automatically respond to the emergency support from the securities
business part, a universal bank must be well equipped with a separation system. It
is not an easy task, though. For that reason, German universal banks need to
126

DOROTHEA SCHÄFER, DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG [DIW
BERLIN], GERMANY’S FINANCIAL CRISIS AND AGENDA FOR A NEW FINANCIAL MARKET
ARCHITECTURE (2009).
127

See Franz-Joerg Semler, CMS Hasche Sigle, Investments in Germany: New
Restrictions for Foreign Investors (2009).
128

Kauf der Dresdner Bank: Commerzbank gewinnt Rechtsstreit mit Aktionären, FIN.
TIMES DEUTSCHLAND, July 12, 2010 (reporting that the judgement of the first instance was
reversed by the high court in favor of the bank managers) (Ger.).
129

Carter Dougherty, Germany Guarantees Bank Deposits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008.
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slowly develop the structure of a financial holding or group 130 as the UK banks
did.
Switzerland 131

2.

In Switzerland, banks dwarf the rest of the economy. This small country
with some eight million people houses more than 200 banks. 132 UBS and Credit
Suisse each have assets of more than one trillion Swiss Francs (USD900 billion),
twice the size of the Swiss economy. 133 The balance sheet of UBS and Credit
Suisse, when combined, is about four times Switzerland’s GDP. Switzerland
thusly has a severe Too-Big-To-Fail problem.
The global financial crisis of 2008 also hit the Swiss banks hard, with
UBS being hit the hardest. UBS wrote off 12.4 billion Swiss Francs in the fourth
quarter of 2007 for losses from the subprime mortgage business. The year 2007
was the year UBS recorded its first ever loss. UBS secured eleven billion Swiss
Francs from the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, and another
two billion Swiss Francs from anonymous investors. In October 2008, the Central
Bank of Switzerland bailed out UBS, investing six billion Swiss Francs to help the
bank spin off USD39 billion of toxic assets into a Swiss National Bank fund. The
federal state sold its UBS holdings for a profit of 1.2 billion Swiss Francs less
than a year later. Credit Suisse also recorded large losses during the same
periods. 134 Credit Suisse secured new investments from investors in Qatar,
declining government assistance.
A panel appointed by the Swiss government has recently issued
recommendations on ways to carve up UBS and Credit Suisse, 135 and Swiss
130

Even under the holding or group structure, there may be strong pressure from
customers of securities business to pierce the corporate veil. See Report from Hwa-Jin Kim &
Yong Jae Kim to the Korea Financial Investment Association, The Future of the Business of
Investment Banking in Korea 97–107 (2010) (Kor.).
131

See IBA Report, at 117–50; Jürgen Dunsch, Notoperation für Schweizer Grossbank
UBS, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Jan. 2, 2011), http://www.faz.net/-00xpzz (Ger.);
Lukas Hässig, Arme Schweiz, DIE ZEIT, Oct. 1, 2008, available at http://www.zeit.de/
2008/41/Finanzkrise-Schweiz (Ger.).
132

According to data from 1994, the ratio of those employed in banking to the total
number of employed was 3.14% in Switzerland, compared to 2.07% in Germany, 1.21% in the
United States, and 0.64% in Japan. See BUSCH, supra note __, at 164.
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SWISS BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.swissbanking.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
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parliament has been discussing the implementation of those recommendations.
The banks are required to draw up plans to separate units that are important for
the country from businesses that would be allowed to fail in a crisis. Swiss
regulators also gave UBS and Credit Suisse four years to raise their risk-weighted
capital to as much as double the Basel II requirements. The Swiss regulators are
seeking more power to break the two giants up before they collapse. 136 Should
another crisis erupt, the government will allow the banks to fail. However, the
panel will not further consider banning proprietary trading and has dropped
proposals to break up the lenders. 137 Thus far, the Volcker Rule has not found
support in Switzerland. 138
A Note on the United Kingdom 139

3.

During the financial crisis, the UK government bailed out banks with a
combined balance sheet of more than two times the UK GDP, which was around
USD2.7 trillion at the end of 2008. 140 As a result, the UK government now owns
some eighty-three percent of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group, 100 percent of
Northern Rock, etc. 141
There is opinion in the UK that favors functional separation of financial
services architecture. It emphasizes “narrow banking,” i.e., tight restriction of the
scope and activities of commercial banks. 142 It has also been reported that the UK
html.
136

UBS website summarizes the virtue of universal banking as follows: “The legal entity
group structure of UBS is designed to support the Group’s businesses within an efficient legal, tax,
regulatory and funding framework. Neither the business divisions of UBS (namely Investment
Bank, Wealth Management Americas, Wealth Management & Swiss Bank and Global Asset
Management) nor Corporate Center are replicated in their own individual legal entities, but rather
they generally operate out of UBS AG (Parent Bank) through its Swiss and foreign branches.”
137
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Avert Icelandic Ending for UBS, BLOOMBERG (May 5, 2010, 6:01 PM ET), http://www.
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considers separating commercial banking and investment banking 143 although it
is not certain if such a plan could be implemented. The Independent Commission
on Banking, created on June 16, 2010 to consider structural and related nonstructural reforms to the UK banking sector, has been looking at separation of
retail and investment banking, limits on proprietary trading and investing, and
measures to reduce market concentration. 144 John Vickers, Chairman of the
Commission, recently ruled out ideas for narrow banking. But he explored the
idea that universal banks might be required to ring-fence certain riskier operations
from their consumer businesses. According to him universal banking had the
disadvantage that unsuccessful investment banking may bring down the whole
bank, including the commercial banking arm. Although he indicated that the
riskier operations of banks could be required to hold more capital rather than
being split off from the bank completely, he rejected the characterization of
investment banking operations as "casinos." 145
As mentioned before, the British system has traditionally been
characterized by independent developments of each financial services sector. This
was so even though the UK did not have any regulation on the delimitation of
financial services. However, the so-called Big Bang of 1987 stimulated the
creation of universal banks in the United Kingdom. As the UK universal banks
adopted the subsidiaries model, not the in-house model, the Bank of England did
not see large contagion risk involved in the universal banking system. 146 Also, the
Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 introduced sophisticated Chinese wall
requirements to regulate the conflicts of interest within the financial group. 147
D.

Exkurs: East Asia

Japan requires the separation of commercial and investment banks as the
U.S. occupation authority put the U.S. system in place in Japan after World War
II. 148 However, the Japanese commercial banks have been engaged in securities
143

See SCOTT, supra note __, at 108.

144

Randell, supra note __, at 7.
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See John Vickers, How to Regulate the Capital and Corporate Structures of Banks?
(Keynote speech given on 22 January 2011 at the London Business School and University of
Chicago Booth School of Business conference on Regulating Financial Intermediaries Challenges and Constraints).
146

See Kim & Kim, supra note __, at 110–21.
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WALLS (2nd ed. 2004).
148
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underwriting since 1993. 149 It is reported that Japanese commercial bank’s
securities underwriting benefits the issuer. 150 Japanese commercial banks are also
permitted to trade commercial papers. China requires segregation, too. 151
Commercial bank deposits are the largest financial assets in China and its weight
is relatively heavier than that of other countries. As far as the investment banking
business is concerned, global houses like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
currently dominate the Chinese market. The global investment banking houses
lead the privatization of State-Owned Chinese firms, investing in Chinese
commercial banks at the same time. 152 Thus far, Japan and China have not shown
great interest in the regulatory developments in the United States, including the
Volcker-Rule.
Korea has a plan for moving toward the universal banking system. The
Korean government also has plans for the so-called ‘megabank’ that can be
created through mega mergers amongst top commercial banks. The whole idea is
that Korean banks are ‘too small to succeed’ in the global market. 153 As the initial
step for moving forward, the Capital Market Integration Act (former Securities
and Exchange Act) was enacted and went into force on February 4, 2009. This
law consolidated five different laws into one body and now regulates securities,
futures and asset management industries. The U.S. style investment banks have
been introduced with the designation ‘financial investment company.’ Even
though Korea requires segregation, commercial banks in Korea have been
expanding into asset management and mergers and acquisitions businesses. They
do investment banking activities through subsidiaries for now. However,
149

See Jun-Koo Kang & Wei-Lin Liu, Is Universal Banking Justified? Evidence from Bank
Underwriting of Corporate Bonds in Japan (Dec. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=641822.
150
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Japan, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 369 (2007).
151

For capital markets in China, see K. THOMAS LIAW, INVESTMENT BANKING AND
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN CHINA (2007); David Eu, Financial Reforms and Corporate
Governance in China, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNA’L L. 469 (1996); Li Guo, The Chinese Financial
Conglomerate and Its Company Law Implications, 7 J. KOREAN L. 197 (2007); Benjamin L.
Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China’s Securities Market, 108 COLUM.
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investment banking business backed by and/or combined with commercial bank's
infrastructure and strong capital base remains as Korean commercial bank CEOs'
ambition. Being defensive, the financial investment industry in Korea keeps
growing. Even after the failed attempt to take over Lehman Brothers in 2008, 154
the Korea Development Bank dreams to become one of the leading investment
banks in East Asia. The regulatory developments in the United States, including
the Volcker-Rule, have received much attention in Korea. 155
IV.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF UNIVERSAL BANKS

After the financial crisis, bank corporate governance has become a hot
issue. In particular, risk management and bank managers’ pay are the focus of
discussion. 156 The corporate governance of banks is not directly related to the
business structure of universal banks. However, the size and complexity of a
financial institution may have impact on its corporate governance and vice versa.
As seen above, the European countries basically want to keep the conventional
universal banking system although they did witness problems inherent to the large
and complex financial institutions. This would make corporate governance of
universal banks a more significant issue than it was before. If they do not want to
adopt the structural approach, prudential rule and corporate governance would be
the alternatives.
Since the 1990s, the corporate governance and finance scholarships have
produced much about legal origin and corporate governance. 157 There is also
discussion on the relationship between legal origin and banking systems. 158 The
154

See Korean Bank in Talks with Lehman Brothers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2008, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/02/business/worldbusiness/02iht-kdb.15817700.html. SORKIN,
supra note __, at 212 – 216.
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See, e.g., Roe, supra note __; Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index”
Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 467 (2009); Rafael La Porta et al. (LLS&V), Investor Protection and
Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); LLS&V, Law and Finance, 106 J. POLITICAL
ECON. 1113 (1998).
158

See Coffee, supra note __ (The Rise of Dispersed Ownership); Caroline Fohlin, Does
Civil Law Tradition and Universal Banking Crowd Out Securities Markets?: Pre-World War I
Germany as Counter-Example, 8 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 602 (2007); Brian R. Cheffins, Investor
Sentiment and Antitrust Law as Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure: The Great
Merger Wave of 1897 to 1903 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=348480.
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discussions below, however, focus on the corporate governance of banks, not the
banks’ role in corporate governance. Despite its importance, research on the
corporate governance of banks and bank directors’ liabilities has been relatively
rare. 159 The global financial crisis has stimulated discussions on bank corporate
governance in the United States as well as in Europe. 160
A.

Risk Management

1.

Director’s Fiduciary Duty to Manage Risks

Many claim that one of the causes of the global financial crisis is the poor
corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions. 161 Bank managers
were not prudent and the board of directors of banks did not prevent risky lending
practices. 162 Banks’ internal control system did not function properly. Bank
managers’ risk appetite was too big, and they regularly ignored risk officers’
warnings, with Goldman Sachs and BNP Paribas 163 being exceptions. Part of the
bank managers’ aggressive attitude to risks can be attributed to their
compensation system. 164 One study, after looking at 306 financial institutions in
159

For a discussion on the corporate governance of banks using data from 740 banks in 41
countries to evaluate the independence of outside directors, see generally Daniel Ferreira et al.,
Boards of Banks (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 289/2010,
2010). See generally Pablo de Andres & Eleuterio Vallelado, Corporate Governance in Banking:
The Role of the Board of Directors, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 2570 (2008); Olubunmi Faleye &
Karthik Krishnan, Risky Lending: Does Bank Corporate Governance Matter? (23rd Australasian
Fin. & Banking Conference 2010 Paper, 2010); James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public
Company Management: Lessons from Bank Regulation (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies,
Working Paper No. 49, 2006); Hanna Westman, The Role of Ownership Structure and Regulatory
Environment in Bank Corporate Governance (Jan. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1435041; BENTON E. GUP ED., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKING: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2007).
160

For recent research, see The Governance and Regulation of Financial Institutions:
Lessons from the Crisis, 8 RES. NEWSL. (European Corporate Governance Inst., Brussels, Belg.),
Summer 2010; Corporate Governance and the New Financial Regulation: Complements or
Substitutes?, 9 RES. NEWSL. (European Corporate Governance Inst., Brussels, Belg.), Spring 2011.
161

But see Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock
Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1 (2009).
162

See Taylor, supra note __.

163

See Nicholas Calcina Howson, Commentary, When “Good” Corporate Governance
Makes “Bad” (Financial) Firms: The Global Crisis and the Limits of Private Law, 108 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 44, 48 (2009), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/
howson.pdf.
164

For the relationship between bank performance and corporate governance during the
financial crises, see Andrea Beltratti & Rene M. Stulz, WHY DID SOME BANKS PERFORM BETTER
DURING THE CREDIT CRISIS? A CROSS-COUNTRY STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE AND
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31 countries, concludes that the higher the ownership of institutional investors and
the ratios of bonuses in CEO compensation package, the higher was the tendency
of risk taking. 165
Banks are at the risk center. 166 A bank’s business centers on taking
risks. 167 The board of directors of banks determines the risk tolerance and the risk
appetite of the bank, and develops business strategies based on that decision.
Therefore, risk management is at the core of a bank manager’s duty. 168 The
severity of the 2008 financial crisis was very much about how big banks’
managers acquired and mismanaged huge risks 169 and in the process damaged the
rest of the financial market and industry, and the broader economy. 170 Banks
should construct corporate governance in a way that could maximize the value of
the bank as a business organization and, at the same time, minimize the systemic
risk. 171 If banks’ managers took on excessive risk, they may have benefited the
shareholders short-term, but harmed the shareholders in the long run through
having externalized the costs to the system. 172 One study even argues that boards
REGULATION (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 254/2009, 2009). For the
corporate governance implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Quack
Federal Corporate Governance Round II (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 1012, 2010).
165

David Erkens et al., Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis:
Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 249/2009, 2009).
166

PHILIP WOOD, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 333–34 (2008).

167

COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE DIRECTOR’S BOOK: THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL
BANK DIRECTOR 10–15 (1997); JAMES W. KOLARI & BENTON E. GUP, COMMERCIAL BANKING:
THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK (3rd ed. 2005); HANNA WESTMAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
EUROPEAN BANKS: ESSAYS ON BANK OWNERSHIP 5 (2009); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153
(1988).
168

Martin Lipton et al., Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Risk Management and the Board
of Directors (2008).
169

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L.
967 (2009).
170

Letter from Simon Johnson to Members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council,
supra note __.
171

See generally George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation,
16 CATO J. 17 (1996); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008). For
discussions on Germany, see Daniel Zimmer & Florian Fuchs, Die Bank in Krise und Insolvenz:
Ansätze zur Minderung des systemischen Risikos, 39 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 597 (2010) (Ger.).
172

See 9 RES. NEWSL. (European Corporate Governance Inst.), supra note __, at 1.
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of directors of banks were not supposed to minimize the agency costs, but serve a
public purpose such as stabilizing financial markets and politics.173 John Coffee
is skeptical about empowering bank shareholders because the shareholders’
incentives might be to take greater risk through increasing bank’s leverage. 174
The European Commission’s Green Paper of June 2, 2010 questions whether
shareholder control of financial institutions is still realistic. 175 At this point, the
entire discussion on the stakeholder model and sustainability comes back to
life. 176
Germany and Switzerland

2.

In 1998, Germany amended the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) to
introduce the director’s duty to manage enterprise risk. 177 Article 91, Section 2 of
the Aktiengesetz provides that the management board shall take suitable measures,
in particular surveillance measures, to ensure that developments threatening the
continuation of the company are detected early. 178 Also, Section 4.1.4 of the
German Corporate Governance Code stipulates that the management board of
listed companies ensures appropriate risk management and risk controlling in the

173

See J. R. Booth et al., Boards of Directors, Ownership, and Regulation, 26 J. BANKING
& FIN. 1973 (2002).
174

See 9 RES. NEWSL. (European Corporate Governance Inst.), supra note __, at 5 – 6
(“[T]he more shareholder-friendly the corporate governance regime is at a financial institution, the
more that financial institution will ride the rollercoaster of having high earnings in the boom years,
and falling earnings and near-bankruptcy in the down years”).
175

See John Armour & Wolf-Georg Ringe, European Company Law 1999-2010:
Renaissance and Crisis 39 – 41 (ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 175/2011), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1691688.
176

See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439 (2001); Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence:
Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50
HARV. INT’L L. J. 129 (2009).
177

One study finds that the German supervisory board’s (in-)competence in finance was
related to losses in the financial crisis. See Harald Hau & Marcel P. Thum, Subprime Crisis and
Board (In-)Competence: Private vs. Public Banks in Germany (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2640,
2009).
178

The original language of the article is as follows: “Der Vorstand hat geeignete
Massnahmen zu treffen, insbesondere ein Überwachungssystem einzurichten, damit den
Fortbestand der Gesellschaft gefährdende Entwicklungen früh erkannt werden.” It may therefore
be argued that the article only refers to “Entwicklungen” (developments), not “Risiken” (risks).
However, there seems to be no difficulty in interpreting the article to duly recognize a director’s
duty to manage risk. See THEODOR BAUMS, HOUSE OF FIN. GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT FRANKFURT,
RISIKO UND RISIKOSTEUERUNG IM AKTIENECHT (2010) (Ger.).
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enterprise. 179 Article 25a, Section 1 of the German Banking Act (Gesetz über das
Kreditwesen - KWG) provides that an institution bank must have in place suitable
arrangements for managing, monitoring and controlling risks and appropriate
arrangements by means of which the institution's financial situation can be gauged
with sufficient accuracy at all times. It also provides that an institution must have
a proper business organization, an appropriate internal control system, and
adequate security precautions for the deployment of electronic data processing.180
Recently, the German Law on Modernization of Corporate Accounting (BilMoG)
has introduced the concept of risk management into the German Commercial
Code (Handelsgesetzbuch – HGB) and Aktiengesetz. 181 It remains to be seen how
the regulatory developments will lead to better risk management in German
universal banks.
It is interesting to see that the BaFin developed special rules for financial
services firms that link the compensation issue to risk management. In August
2009, it published an updated version of the Minimum Requirements for Risk
Management (Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement). The rule
requires financial institutions to maintain an appropriate risk management system
pursuant to Paragraph 25 of the KWG, and then Section 71 of the rule addresses
the parameters of incentive systems for bank staff. According to that, incentive
systems must be harmonized with the general strategic targets of the bank. In
particular, compensation systems must be designed so as not to encourage bank
managers to take inappropriate levels of risks. Back office people, in particular
those involved in risk control, have to also be compensated in a way that
appropriately reflects their responsibilities. 182

179

HENRIK-MICHAEL RINGLEB ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM DEUTSCHEN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE KODEX 179–85 (3rd ed., 2008) (Ger.).
180

AKTIENGESETZ KOMMENTAR 1032–39 (KARSTEN SCHMIDT & MARCUS LUTTER EDS.,
2008) (Ger.); HANDBUCH DES VORSTANDSRECHTS § 19 (HOLGER FLEISCHER ED., 2006) (Ger.);
WERNER PAUKER, UNTERNEHMEN – RISIKO – HAFTUNG: DIE FUNKTION DER
GESCHÄFTSLEITERHAFTUNG VOR DEM HINTERGRUND DER STEUERUNG UND VERTEILUNG
UNTERNEHMERISCHE RISIKEN (2008) (Ger.).
181

Michael Kort, Risikomanagement nach dem Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz, 39
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 440 (2010) (Ger.). For the concept
of ‘risk’ under German law, see SCHMIDT & LUTTER, supra note __, at 1036 and Jochen Pampel &
Dietmar Glage, Unternehmensrisiken und Risiko-management, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE:
HANDBUCH DER HAFTUNGSVERMEIDUNG IM UNTERNEHMEN 84 (CHRISTOPH E. HAUSCHKA ED.,
2007) (Ger.).
182

For legal rules and discussions regarding remuneration in Switzerland, see Kunz, supra
note __, at 113–14 (calling the issue a “political hot potato” in Switzerland).
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Swiss law also recognizes the directors’ duty to carry out risk assessment
and risk management. They are obliged to define the company's risk appetite and
tolerance and monitor possible risks. A director’s duty to manage risks was
introduced in Article 663b of the Swiss Code of Obligations in 2008 although
scholars regarded such a duty as given under Article 716a, Paragraph 1 of the
Code. 183 The Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance of 2002, as
amended, effective January 1, 2008, encourages listed companies and
economically significant private companies in Switzerland to set up audit
committees for risk management.
3.

Bank Directors’ Liability

The German IKB’s former CEO currently stands trial for having misled
shareholders and having breached fiduciary duties. He has been accused of not
having properly managed risks involved in new financial products and economic
developments. It is expected that the legal controversy over the scope of the
business judgment rule will take place in terms of the management of the financial
institution. 184 Germany formally introduced the business judgment rule in Article
93, Paragraph 1 of Aktiengesetz in 2005. 185
A bank director can sign a risky contract with a third party on behalf of
the bank by considering the interests of the firm. In such a case, whether it should
be deemed as the director’s neglect of duty towards the corporation is not easy to
answer at a glance. That is because it may be viewed as a breach of neither laws
and regulations nor the articles of incorporation. Nevertheless, signing a risky
contract may expose the corporation to the possibility of insolvency so as to deal a
blow in achieving the company’s business objectives while affecting the reliance
on the company placed by its interested parties such as its shareholders, officers
and employees. From the perspective that a company does not exist solely for the
purpose of seeking the financial interests of its shareholders, but is a social being
that should be sustainable, 186 such an act of a director may cause harm to the
183

See Peter V. Kunz, Swiss Corporate Governance–an Overview, in SWISS REPORTS
PRESENTED AT THE XVIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 99, 111–12 (2010).
184

See IBA Report, at 93.

185

Cf. ANDREA LOHSE, UNTERNEHMERISCHES ERMESSEN (2005) (Ger.). Article 754 of
Swiss Code of Obligations stipulates directors’ duties and liabilities. Although the business
judgment rule has not been formally introduced in Switzerland yet, Swiss directors can be
insulated from liabilities by fulfilling similar requirements as those for the application of the
business judgment rule in the United States and Germany.
186

Cf. ANDRES R. EDWARDS, THE SUSTAINABILITY REVOLUTION: PORTRAIT OF A
PARADIGM SHIFT (2005); CHRIS LASZLO, THE SUSTAINABLE COMPANY: HOW TO CREATE LASTING
VALUE THROUGH SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE (2003).
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company as well as to all of its interested parties even though it is in the shortterm interest of shareholders. As banks create systemic risks, the sustainability
consideration is more compelling to bank directors. 187
The level of a director’s fiduciary duty owed to the corporation very
much depends upon the size and business area of the corporation. The rule can be
best understood in terms of bank director liability. Banks are required to
contribute to the stability of the financial markets and to the development of the
national economy. Therefore, for instance, the Korean Supreme Court once ruled
that bank directors must fulfill their fiduciary duties with utmost (enhanced)
care. 188 Swiss law also recognizes higher levels of duty owed by the directors’ of
financial institutions. 189 The conventional protection provided by the business
judgment rule may be weaker for bank directors. Such fiduciary duties include the
duty to properly manage risks as discussed above. By violating the duty to
manage risks, bank director can be held liable to the bank and/or shareholders,
depending upon the jurisdiction. 190 The bank director may breach the fiduciary
duty to the bank even when the director acted in the short-term interest of the
bank if the act exposed the bank to higher enterprise risk and caused the bank to
be responsible for the increase of systemic risk. 191
B.

Bankers’ Pay

187

For a bank manager’s obligations under the various laws in the United States, see
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTORS (SECTION 501)
(1998).
188

See Hwa-Jin Kim, Directors’ Duties and Liabilities in Corporate Control and
Restructuring Transactions: Recent Developments in Korea, 2006 Oxford U. COMP. L. F. 2.
189

See Kunz, supra note __, at 132.

190

Under Article 401 of the Korean Commercial Code, a director may be held jointly and
severally liable to third parties for any damages incurred by such third parties resulting in the
failure of such director to perform his or her duties, either willfully or by gross negligence. This
provision is unique in that it holds directors liable to third parties for breach of their fiduciary
duties owed to their own corporation. Third parties regularly incur losses due to corporation’s
breach of their contract. Therefore, it is puzzling and hard to understand why directors who
decided to breach a third-party contract for the benefit their corporation and shareholders got held
liable to third parties. The Korean Supreme Court and other Korean courts have had a difficult
line-drawing problem and had to identify the circumstances where breach of a third-party contract
done for the benefit of the company constitutes director's breach of fiduciary duty to the company.
See Kim, supra note __ [Corporate Governance of Banks and Bank Director Liability].
191

See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009);
Robert T. Miller, The Board’s Duty to Monitor Risk after Citigroup, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1153
(2010).
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How to regulate the bankers’ compensation has been a hot issue since the
outbreak of the financial crisis. It is now well known that compensation
arrangements in the investment banking industry arguably 192 motivated excessive
risk taking. 193 The problem is, however, that no matter how the bonus
arrangements were made, it was not to serve the shareholders’ interest. Most pay
and bonus arrangements were linked to the actual performance of bank
managers. 194 Therefore, private ordering may not solve the problem satisfactorily.
Rather, government’s direct intervention will do the job. The Dodd-Frank Act
addresses the issue by requiring shareholders’ non-binding resolution for CEO
compensation and the golden parachute (‘say on pay’) 195 modeled after the UK’s
shareholder advisory vote on directors’ compensation. The SEC has the authority
to waive the requirement. Firms are required to set up a compensation committee
with independent directors for that matter. Financial institutions with assets in
excess of one billion dollars shall disclose compensation arrangement including
performance-linked bonuses.
European countries have also introduced the regulation on bankers’ pay by
promulgating guidelines. Under huge political pressure, banks in the UK,
Germany and France moved to limit bonuses in 2009. In 2010, the European
Union enacted legislation to force European banks to curb excessive pay to
bankers. 196 Bankers in the European Union will be barred from taking more than
192

See 9 RES. NEWSL. (European Corporate Governance Inst.), supra note __, at 5
(summarizing John Coffee’s assertion that Dodd-Frank was premised on the still debatable
assumption that flaws in executive compensation formulas were responsible in significant part for
the crisis).
193

See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear
Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion
Paper No. 657, 2010).
194

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247
(2009); Written Testimony Submitted by Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman and
Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the
Corporate Governance Program at Harvard Law School, Before the Committee on Financial
Services, United States House of Representatives, Hearing on Compensation Structure and
Systemic Risk (June 11, 2009), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
Policy/FSC-written-testimony-June-11-09.pdf.
195

Title IX, Subtitle E. Dodd-Frank’s say on pay became effective in January 2011.

196

European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 7 July 2010 on the Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directives 2006/48/EC and
2006/49/EC As Regards Capital Requirements for the Trading Book and for Re-Securitisations,
and the Supervisory Review of Remuneration Policies, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA(2010)0274 (2010).
Cf. Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies and Remuneration Policies in the Financial
Services Sector, Eur. Parl. Doc. INI/2010/2009 (2010). For the critical comments, see Guido
Ferrarini et al., Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe, 10
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thirty percent of their bonus in cash starting in 2011, and risk losing some of the
remainder should the bank’s performance erode. Banks that do not fully comply
with the rule will have to set aside more capital to make up for the risk. If national
regulators determine that a bank’s compensation structure encourages risk, they
can force the bank to place hundreds of millions of Euros more in its capital
cushion as insurance. Banks that received government bailout funds would also
have to justify the compensation of their managers to the governments. 197
Switzerland, not a member of the European Union, has also introduced limits on
banker’s pay. 198
In the UK, the Financial Services Authority issued the final form of the
revised Remuneration Code on December 17, 2010. The Code introduces
significant restrictions on the way in which remuneration policies and structures
are operated within financial institutions in the UK and beyond. 199 The Code
builds upon international standards set by the Financial Stability Board at a
European level and goes beyond those standards in a number of key respects. 200
The Code, among others, subscribes to the principle of proportionality.
Germany enacted the Law on the Appropriateness of Board Member
Compensation (Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung – VorstAG).
Under the VorstAG, the total compensation for executives must reflect both the
duties and responsibilities owed by them as well as the overall financial situation
of the company. The compensation contract must allow the downsizing of the
compensation package in case the financial situation of the company deteriorates.
The supervisory board members may be held liable if they determined an
inappropriate compensation package for an executive. The annual general
shareholders’ meeting is entitled to approve the compensation package.

J. CORP. L. STUD. 73 (2010).
197

Liz Alderman, Cap on Bank Bonuses Clears Hurdle in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/business/global/08bonus.html; Regierung
will gegen Boni vorgehen, FAZ.net, Oct. 1, 2010, available at http://www.faz.net/s/
RubD16E1F55D21144C4AE3F9DDF52B6E1D9/Doc~E5FA9A1CB36C248039D7BADA76C5F
A759~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html.
198

See Adam C. Pritchard, Populist Retribution and International Competition in
Financial Services Regulation 24–25 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Empirical Legal Studies Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 10-004, 2010).
199

See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, THE
THE FINAL-FORM REMUNERATION CODE 1 (2010).
200

UK’S FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY ISSUES

Id.
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Executive compensation, including bankers’ pay, has been a big issue also
in Switzerland. 201 Upon a citizen’s initiative (the “Abzocker-Initiative”), there is
going to be a national vote on the amendment of Swiss Federal Constitution. 202
The initiative covers a lot of ground, including proposal against rip-off salaries. It
may not be understood as being designed solely for shareholder value, but it may
also target some social goals. 203 The text of the initiative actually states that it
was made “[t]o protect the economy, private property and the shareholders and in
the spirit of sustainable corporate management.” 204 Amongst top Swiss banks,
Credit Suisse seems to lead taking move on bonuses, 205 whereas the UBS rather
balks. 206
C.

The Role of the State in the Corporate Governance of Banks

Government is neither the owner of big businesses nor their financier.
However, government involvement in the corporate governance of private
companies has been increasing recently for various reasons. 207 The failure of any
of a few very large corporations, including financial institutions, can take down a
big part of the economic system. It may also have adverse impacts on the job
markets which are politically sensitive. Government arranges acquisitions,
201

For legal rules and discussions regarding remuneration in Switzerland, see Kunz, supra
note __, at 113 – 114 (calling the issue as “political hot potato” in Switzerland). See Banker-Boni
und die Politik, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, Sept. 4, 2010, available at, http://www.nzz.ch/
nachrichten/wirtschaft/aktuell/banker-boni_und_die_politik_1.7441425.html.
202

Der Lohn endet bei 3 Millionen Franken, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, Dec. 17, 2010,
available at, http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/politik/schweiz/der_lohn_endet_bei_3_millionen_
franken_1.8713070.html.
203

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
14 (2010) (survey examining compensation structure in SMI and SMIM companies as well as sayon-pay).
204

For the full text of the initiative, see Alexander F. Wagner & Christoph Wenk, Say-onPay in Switzerland: Binding Say-on-Pay and Its Impact on Shareholder Value (Working Paper,
2010).
205

See Katharina Bart, Credit Suisse Takes Risky Move on Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10,
2011, available at. http://blogs.wsj.com/source/2011/01/10/credit-suisse-takes-risky-move-onbonuses/?KEYWORDS=Credit+Suisse+Takes+Risky+Move+on+Bonuses.
206

See UBS informiert später über Boni, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, Feb. 4, 2011, available
at. http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/wirtschaft/aktuell/ubs_bonus-zahlungen_1.9351163.html.
207

See generally Jeff Gordon, The Government as Investor/Owner in the U.S.,
TRANSATLANTIC CORP. GOVERNANCE DIALOGUE (Sept. 2009), http://www.ecgi.org/tcgd/2009/pres
e n t a t i o n s / g o r d o n . p d f ; Gerard Hertig, The Government as Investor/Owner in Europe,
TRANSATLANTIC CORP. GOVERNANCE DIALOGUE (Sept. 2009), http://www.ecgi.de/tcgd/2009/
presentations/hertig.pdf.
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sometimes providing the bailout funds to facilitate the deal. For strategically
crucial companies, government acts as the guardian against foreign capital as was
exemplified in the Unocal and Dubai Ports World 208 cases. The concept of
national security209 is being replaced by the concept of systemic importance. The
global financial crisis has called some old principles into question. For the first
time in its history, the U.S. government holds major ownership stakes in large
companies and financial institutions and is playing an increasingly active role in
their governance. 210
The role of government has traditionally been important in the financial
services industry. As there are such stakeholders for commercial banks as
depositors and deposit insurance institutions, government has reasons to get
involved in the corporate governance of commercial banks. 211 In emerging
jurisdictions, large banks have mostly been privatized recently. Their government
and banks are therefore in the shadow of a still fresh memory of the past. The role
of the state has become even more significant after the financial crisis as many
large banks in the United States and Europe were bailed out by the governments.
Although governments now hold a dominant position in the corporate governance
of banks, they are not in the position to effectively manage the banks. Therefore,
the status of the governments in the bank corporate governance needs to be
determined in a way to assist the financial regulatory reform in the United States
as well as in Europe. 212
208

See Jason Cox, Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment After the Dubai Ports
Controversy: Has the U.S. Government Finally Figured Out How to Balance Foreign Threats to
National Security Without Alienating Foreign Companies?, 34 J. CORP. L. 293 (2008); Deborah M.
Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National Security or a Tempest in a
Seaport?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 583 (2007).
209

See EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (2006).
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See Kim Hwa-Jin, Gi-eop-ui so-yuji-baegujo-wa jeongbu-ui yeoghal [Government in
Corporate Governance], 408/409 KOREAN BAR ASS’N J. 60/23 (2010) (Kor.).
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Cf. Jennifer Carpenter et al., Reforming Compensation and Corporate Governance, in:
REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL
FINANCE 493, 506 – 507 (VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL. EDS., 2011).
212

Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, When the Government is the Controlling Shareholder
(Univ. of Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 10-10, 2010) (“Corporate law provides
a complex and comprehensive set of standards of conduct to protect noncontrolling shareholders
from controlling shareholders who have goals other than maximizing firm value, but are designed
with private parties in mind. We show that when the government is the controlling shareholder, the
Delaware restrictions are largely displaced, but hardly replaced, by federal provisions. When GM
goes public again, government ownership of a controlling position will be a significant ‘risk
factor.’”)
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V.

A GLOBAL STRUCTURAL REGULATION?

A.

Convergence in Financial Regulation

Since the 1980s, national corporate governance systems have been the
focus of numerous academic studies. Good corporate governance law and practice
were believed to be competitive forces not only for individual firms, but also for
national economies. Comparative corporate law studies 213 and convergence
theories 214 gained much attention accordingly. Now, it is about time to (re)focus
on financial regulatory systems of the world in terms of competition and
convergence. As Bernard Black did suggest it for comparative corporate
governance studies, 215 many of the core problems of financial regulatory system
are universal, and, accordingly, the range of reasonable solutions may be finite.
Universal banking and its regulatory issues need to be studied seriously in order to
understand the origins of structural differences of financial markets and financial
services industries. Comparative financial system and regulation must regain its
importance in academia and practice. As Adam Pritchard puts it, regulation on big
banks will converge over time, but jurisdictional competition for hedge funds will
be one of the most important topics in the future. 216 We need to know whether
different structures achieve distinct level of performance and the structural
differences are the sole result of different regulatory attitudes. 217

213

See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, America’s Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate
Governance, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 367 (1996); Brian Cheffins & Bernard Black, Outside Director
Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385 (2006); Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of
Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791 (2002); MARK J.
ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE (1994); REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL. EDS., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 2ND ED. (2009); Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of
Directors and Company Officials Part 2: Court Procedures, Indemnification and Insurance, and
Administrative and Criminal Liability, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1; Bernard Black et al., Legal
Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1: Substantive Grounds for Liability, 2007
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 614.
214

See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __; RANDALL K. MORCK ED., A HISTORY
AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL

OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
MANAGERS (2005).
215

See Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium:
Enhancing International Competitiveness, 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 544 (2001).
216

See Pritchard, supra note __ at __.
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See Alfred Steinherr, Performance of Universal Banks: Historical Review and
Appraisal, 2 in: SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note __, at 2.
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The efficiency and (international) competitiveness of financial institutions
are an inherent part of any country's development strategy. Economies of scale
and scope are the primary goal of the banking business as it is in other businesses.
Big banks and universal banks are an attractive model, including to bank
managers, shareholders and employees; but ironically, big banks and universal
banks can create systemic risk easier than smaller and specialized banks. It can
ruin the entire economy. This is the dilemma most governments face. It is part of
the tensions between regulation and competition that can never be resolved once
and for all as Davies and Green put it. 218 The solutions are different as the
economic and political situations are different, but at the same time, no financial
system is isolated from others. Convergence and persistence will be an important
topic in this area in the coming years. Comparative financial system study, 219
therefore, may benefit the evolution of international financial regulation. 220
The Volcker-Rule may set the direction for international guidelines for
the structure of doing banking business also outside the United States as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did in international corporate governance. 221
Although governments will differ in opinions in respect of the substance of the
Volcker-Rule, they will not have serious problem on agreeing on the core
proposition behind the Volcker-Rule that the commercial banking activities of a
universal bank should not stray too far from their central mission of serving their
customers. Such guidelines may well shape the structure of large international
banks’ businesses in future. Corporate governance of financial institutions may be
a good starting point. 222 As shown above, there is a significant convergence in
law and practice of corporate governance (of banks) amongst the United States,
Germany and Switzerland. It is not something that was created through European
countries’ responses or adaptation to the developments in the United States and
U.S. system. It has been made possible because the governments agree on such
218

HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID GREEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE ESSENTIAL
GUIDE 29 (2009)
219

For a survey, see Joseph Haubrich & James B. Thomson, Comparative Financial
Systems: Introduction, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 421 (1998) and Franklin Allen &
Douglas Gale, Comparative Financial Systems: A Survey (Ctr. for Fin. Insts., Working Paper No.
01-15, 2001).
220

Whether there existed a relationship between regulatory structure and financial stability
is a controversial issue. See DAVIES & GREEN, supra note __, at 205–06. Cf. Jiandong Ju & ShangJin Wei, When Is Quality of Financial System a Source of Comparative Advantage? (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13984, 2008).
221

Cf. Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1857 (2007).
222

See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note __, at 239-50.
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basic propositions of corporate governance of banks as risk management,
management accountability and transparency.
B.

Allocation of Regulatory Authority

To be sure, it is hard to foresee whether a meaningful international
regulatory arrangement could be made. It will not be easy to create international
rules for the business structure and conduct of financial institutions. Governments
have incentives to cooperate with other governments but only to the extent that
they achieve their own policy goals. Nevertheless, incentives to cooperate on the
global level are far greater than so far due to the severity of the financial crisis, the
stage of global integration of financial markets, 223 and the activities of financial
institutions. Scholars have emphasized the need for ongoing coordination and
cooperation between European and U.S. regulators for the effective supervision of
financial conglomerates. 224 National financial systems will converge at least for
the time being and an international standard will emerge. International supervision
and prudential regulations have been proven to be feasible and work well in
practice. John Coffee also predicts international convergence in financial
regulation supporting the contingent capital alternative. 225 The future of universal
banking and big global financial institutions will be determined by such standards.
This may be different than it has been in the corporate governance area where
formal convergence has been proven most difficult due to various pathdependence-related factors. 226
The approach to the issue of the allocation of regulatory authority227
should not be de facto extraterritoriality or forced harmonization, though. Such an
223

Stock exchange mergers continue. See NYSE, Deutsche Börse Talk Tie-Up as
Competition Intensifies, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704858404576134153000503870.html. See also Roberta S. Karmel, The
Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355 (2007).
224

Kern Alexander, Eilis Ferran, Howell Jackson & Niamh Moloney, A Report on the
Transatlantic Financial Services Regulatory Dialogue 28 – 31 (Harv. L. & Econ. Discussion Paper
No. 576, January 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=961269.
225

John C. Coffee, Jr., Bail-Ins versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate
Systemic Risk (Columbia Law School, Working Paper No. 380/2010, 2010). Contingent capital is a
debt security that can automatically be converted into equity to avoid bankruptcy. The Dodd-Frank
Act authorizes the Fed to mandate the use of contingent capital. See Section 165(b)(1)(B) of the
Dodd-Frank Act.
226

Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
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For an early discussion on the proper allocation of global regulatory authority, see
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approach may arguably cause jurisdictional conflicts 228 and a race to the bottom
through competition among governmental bodies. The Dodd-Frank Act grants
U.S. courts jurisdiction to hear securities actions brought by the SEC or the
Justice Department that involve extraterritorial elements. 229 Also, as indicated
above, the Dodd-Frank Act could operate along similar lines to the SarbanesOxley Act’s effects on international corporate governance. For example, Section
173 of the Dodd-Frank Act stipulates access guidelines to the U.S. financial market
by foreign firms. The SEC is authorized to refuse to register foreign brokers that
present a risk to the U.S. financial system and have a home country that has not
adopted or progressed toward adopting financial regulation to mitigate that risk.
David Skeel points to the provision as an attempt to force harmonization of
international financial regulation. 230 The speculation is that the provision aims to
force other countries to put regulatory structures similar to the Dodd-Frank Act in
place, or face with consequences against their own firms. 231 The approach is not
productive. The Unites States, and any other state in the world, should not use
foreign firms, either listed on its stock exchange or doing business within the state,
in its foreign policy enforcement. If the United States wants to achieve
harmonization, it should do so through an international forum and/or international
rule-making agency. The substance of the Volcker-Rule can be housed in an
international rule to be effectively disseminated to outside of the United States.
C.

The Role of the Basel Committee

Convergence in the regulation of financial institutions can be achieved
through voluntary, not forced, harmonization. The European Union has been
successful in harmonizing national standards in capital markets law 232 through
Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 649 (2001).
228

As far as the U.S. securities law is concerned, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently put
limits on its extraterritorial reach: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, June 24, 2010, http://
www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1191.pdf.
See
generally
Erez
Reuveni,
Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the Extraterritorial Application of the
Securities Laws, 43 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1071 (2010); Amir Licht, Xi Li & Jordan I. Siegel, What
Makes the Bonding Stick?: A Natural Experiment Involving the Supreme Court and Cross-Listed
Firms (Harv. Bus. School Working Paper 11-072, 2011).
229

Sections 929P(b), 929Y.

230

SKEEL, supra note __, at 184.

231

Id. Others suggest that this may also be an attempt to reduce regulatory arbitrage. See
MAYER BROWN, UNDERSTAND THE NEW FINANCIAL REFORM LEGISLATION: THE DODD-FRANK
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 105 (2010).
232

See EILÍS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET (2005) (discussing the
fundamental issues concerning the legal framework that has been established to support a single
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reciprocity and commonality principles. 233 The IOSCO has also been doing
excellent works on creating centralized set of minimum standards in the securities
regulation. Convergence in bank corporate governance is not the product of forced
harmonization and therefore amenable to international rules. Financial regulations
should follow suit.
As the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision already has created
guidelines for corporate governance of banks, 234 it can also be instrumental in
creating the international rules for the structure of banking businesses. The Basel
Committee already has excellent track records in making and implementing the
prudential rules. Its rules are well complied even by non-member states of the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) due to their nature as soft law. 235 As the
Committee itself states, it is “best known for its international standards on capital
adequacy; the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision; and the
Concordat on cross-border banking supervision.” 236 The author once suggested
that the BIS rules greatly influenced corporate governance of Korean companies
through the involvement of the International Monetary Fund in the regulatory
reform process in Korea after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. 237 If the
Committee promulgates relevant rules for the structure of banking business, the
rule may have strong normative power through similar mechanism. 238 Again, if
member states are still not ready to accept such an approach, the Committee may
expand and strengthen the power of prudential rules and improve the bank
corporate governance.

EU securities market).
233

See generally Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities
Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 207 (1999); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 55(2011).
234
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FOR BANKING ORGANISATIONS (1999); BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR BANKING ORGANISATIONS (2006); INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
CORPORATION, THE 2006 BCBS GUIDELINES ON ENHANCING THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR
BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (2006).
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See Daniel E. Ho, Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries
Implement the Basle Accord?, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 647 (2002); Lawrence L. C. Lee, The Basle
Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (1998).
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VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This Article reviewed the historical background of the Glass-Steagall Act
of 1933 along with the developments in the markets that led to the GLBA. It
analyzed the discussions on the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Act in terms of
the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act from a comparative perspective. Many
countries developed the plan for moving toward the universal banking system that
has been prevalent in Europe and the United States since the enactment of the
GLBA. This Article concludes that the developments and discussions in the
United States have been shaped largely through politics in the United States then
and now. The United States once separated commercial banking and investment
banking for political reasons. The separation was abandoned for economic reasons,
and partially restored again for largely political reasons. The whole process was
uniquely American. To support the argument, this Article looked into the situation
in Europe, in particular in Germany and Switzerland; however, this Article
generally agrees with the proposition that the commercial banking activities of a
universal bank should not stray too far from their central mission of serving their
customers, and proposes that international rules for the business structure and
conduct of financial institutions including the proposition could be possible.
Convergence in bank corporate governance is a good indication for one in
financial regulation.
Transatlantic differences in the financial system and structure of banking
business can be attributed to political and historical factors. Banks are under the
strong influence of the history and politics of their states of origin and places of
business, and their strategy is determined by such factors. However, the practices
and strategies of financial institutions in the United States and Europe seem to
converge toward each other. The U.S. financial institutions have been pursuing
the European universal banking model ever since the Glass-Steagall Act was
enacted. European universal banks have been expanding into the investment
banking business through aggressive acquisitions as well as organic growth. Over
time, two sides of the Atlantic may look much alike as far as the structure of
banking business is concerned. It seems that the global financial crisis has
contributed to the trend. Now it is time for legal reform to follow the
developments in practices. To maintain current levels of standards of living, we
need to keep financial complexity as it is today 239 and develop the regulatory
sophistication by which the global economy could benefit from the financial
services on the global scale.
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